Ultracargo Expands Rail Logistics for Biofuels Between Brazil’s Midwest and Southeast

BRL 95 million investment strengthens ethanol transport corridor, cuts costs, and improves rail efficiency between MT and SP

Ultracargo has started operations of a new rail siding at its terminal in Rondonópolis, Mato Grosso, reinforcing one of Brazil’s most strategic logistics corridors for biofuels and petroleum products. The BRL 95 million investment strengthens integration between the Midwest and Southeast regions and significantly expands the company’s operational capacity.

The four-kilometer rail siding connects the terminal directly to the regional rail network and allows the operation of trains with up to 80 railcars. The project improves the flow of biofuels,  especially corn ethanol produced in Mato Grosso, toward major consumption and distribution hubs in São Paulo.

The new infrastructure enables a highly efficient return-freight model. Trains that deliver petroleum products to Mato Grosso now return to the Southeast loaded with biofuels, reducing empty runs and lowering overall logistics costs. The shift also supports the partial migration from road to rail transport, increasing reliability and efficiency over long distances.

With the project, Ultracargo’s Rondonópolis terminal now has an annual handling capacity of up to 3 million cubic meters. The investment also included the expansion of storage capacity by 15,000 cubic meters with two new ethanol tanks, as well as upgrades to rail and truck loading platforms. These improvements have reduced the logistics cycle between Mato Grosso and São Paulo by up to two days.

The rail expansion also brings environmental gains. By reducing long-haul trucking, Ultracargo estimates a reduction of approximately 51,000 tons of carbon emissions per year, around 35% lower emissions along the corridor.

The project gains further relevance through its connection with Ultracargo’s rail siding in Paulínia, São Paulo, completed in June 2025. The integration links Rondonópolis directly to the Opla terminal, a joint venture with BP, supporting the growing demand of Brazil’s sugar-energy sector and ensuring continuous fuel supply.

Ultracargo is Brazil’s largest independent liquid bulk storage company, operating integrated logistics solutions for fuels, biofuels, chemicals and vegetable oils across multiple transport modes nationwide.

Brazil’s Banco Master: The Fraud Scandal Alarming the Brazilian Market

The Brazilian banking sector is facing a major financial scandal that began in November 2025, raising serious doubts about regulatory oversight, public governance, and the potential misuse of state-owned institutions. At the center of the controversy is Banco Master, a formerly obscure private lender that rapidly expanded through high-risk strategies and alleged financial fraud, particularly concerning its recent ties with BRB, a state-controlled bank in Brazil’s Federal District — which is governed by Ibaneis Rocha, a known supporter of Bolsonaro, up to the point of that his Secretary of Security, Anderson Torres, was arrested for his role in the attempted coup d'état of January 8th in Brasília.

The corporate acquisition which appeared to be a typical process has developed into Brazil's most significant financial crisis of recent times because investigations have discovered evidence of fraud and careless supervision and the intentional use of public resources to conceal private financial losses.

How Banco Master’s High Returns Hid a Massive Fraud

The general public first learned about Banco Master when the bank launched its digital investment platforms and fintech applications to advertise its Certificates of Deposit (CDBs). The products provided returns that exceeded market standards because they paid up to 140% of Brazil's benchmark interbank rate which is known as the CDI.

Retail investors showed immediate interest in the high financial returns. The major Brazilian banks which include Itaú, Santander, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal cannot match those returns because doing so would lead to financial losses. Financial markets use exceptionally high returns as warning signs which applied in this situation.

Artificial Growth Through Questionable Assets

The bank used its capital base for growth by buying debt securities which it acquired through secret price agreements. The receivables do not have established pricing systems which operate in the same way as stocks and bonds that trade on regulated exchanges.

The bank built up its asset base through the acquisition of billions of reais worth of assets whose actual value it could not determine. Banco Master used this method to create a deceptive financial appearance which showed more assets and greater profits while it built up its actual danger to both itself and the entire financial system.

The Role of BRB and Public Money

The analysts started to sound alarms after they discovered that Banco Master business operations created a risk which threatened the stability of Brazil's Credit Guarantee Fund system. The FGC would need to pay Banco Master customers at least tens of billions of reais because a Banco Master failure would create the need for protection against institutional breakdowns which required access to government-backed funds.

The unexpected situation found its resolution when BRB, the public bank operated by the Federal District government, announced its intention to buy Banco Master.

The decision drew immediate attention because people wanted to know why a public bank would spend taxpayer money to purchase a private bank which most people considered to be worthless.

The investigators discovered one important fact when they studied the case: BRB had already injected massive amounts of money into Banco Master before the acquisition proposal became public. BRB acquired approximately R$ 4.7 billion worth of Banco Master credit portfolio between August and December of the previous year because the bank needed to pay upfront for assets which would take multiple years to create any financial returns.

Profits That Wouldn’t Exist Otherwise

Shortly afterward, Banco Master reported an impressive R$ 1 billion profit for 2024. This figure became the central argument used to justify the acquisition: the bank was allegedly profitable, efficient, and attractive.

But financial analysts quickly dismantled that narrative. Without BRB’s massive purchases, Banco Master would not only have failed to post a profit, it would have recorded substantial losses and likely collapsed.

In practical terms, public money was used to “clean up” Banco Master’s balance sheet, artificially boosting its results just in time to support the acquisition thesis.

The analogy used by critics was blunt: it was like renovating a collapsing house with your own money, and then buying it at full market price once the renovation inflated its value.

From “Toxic” to “Attractive” Overnight

Once BRB absorbed much of Banco Master’s risk, the market’s perception changed dramatically. Other major financial institutions, including Itaú, BTG Pactual, and Santander, reportedly expressed interest in acquiring parts of Banco Master.

Critics argue that this creates a perverse outcome: private banks may cherry-pick the most valuable assets, while BRB, and ultimately Brazilian taxpayers, are left holding the riskiest and least recoverable portions of the portfolio.

The Fall of Daniel Vorcaro

The scandal culminated in the arrest of Daniel Vorcaro, Banco Master’s controlling shareholder, by Brazil’s Federal Police. Authorities accuse him of fraudulent management, reckless administration, and leading a criminal organization.

Investigators allege that Banco Master simulated credit transactions, sold non-existent or unbacked loan portfolios, and systematically deceived regulators and investors. According to prosecutors, the estimated fraud may reach R$ 12 billion.

The Central Bank ultimately ordered Banco Master’s extrajudicial liquidation, triggering the largest FGC intervention in Brazilian history, with reimbursements totaling R$ 41 billion and affecting more than 1.6 million creditors.

A Turning Point for Brazil’s Financial System

Regulators, economists, and market participants now agree: there will be a Brazilian financial system before and after Banco Master.

The case exposed deep structural weaknesses: from regulatory enforcement failures to conflicts between public institutions and private interests. 

It also reignited debate over the aggressive sale of complex financial products to retail investors and the commission-driven incentive structure of investment advisors.

Whether the scandal leads to lasting reform or fades into another chapter of unpunished financial misconduct will depend on the outcome of ongoing investigations — and on whether Brazil strengthens institutions like the Central Bank and the Securities Commission (CVM) rather than allowing them to remain understaffed and politically constrained.

One thing, however, is already clear: Banco Master is no longer just a bank failure — it is a defining test of Brazil’s financial integrity.

The Global Biofuel Shift: How Brazil’s Ethanol Strategy Navigates the China-US Rivalry

The global energy landscape is undergoing a structural transformation, and at the heart of this shift lies Brazil. As the world’s leading producer of sugarcane ethanol and a rapidly growing player in corn-based biofuels, Brazil finds itself in a strategic sweet spot between two superpowers: China and the United States. While the U.S. has long been a traditional partner, China’s recent pivot toward Brazilian ethanol as a cornerstone of its green transition is redefining trade dynamics and sending ripples through global commodity markets.

China’s interest in Brazilian ethanol is driven by a pragmatic necessity to meet ambitious carbon reduction targets. With a goal to integrate sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) into its massive aviation sector, which consumes over 80 million tons of fuel annually, Beijing has identified Brazil’s ethanol as a superior alternative to its current reliance on recycled cooking oil. This move is not just about environmental goals; it is a strategic play for self-sufficiency and unity among Global South nations, especially as trade tensions with the U.S. escalate over tariffs and protectionist policies.

The rise of corn ethanol in Brazil is a game-changer that brings both opportunities and complex market challenges. Historically, Brazil’s ethanol production was dominated by sugarcane, but corn-based production is projected to reach nearly 10 billion liters in the current cycle, with capacity potentially doubling by the early 2030s. This expansion is creating a "structural shift" in the domestic market, as corn ethanol begins to compete directly with sugarcane for market share. This competition is likely to depress ethanol prices at the pump, benefiting consumers but squeezing the profit margins of traditional sugarcane mills.

Corn Ethanol Expansion Strengthens Brazil’s Livestock Industry Through DDG Supply

This rapid growth in the 100% corn-based ethanol sector has had a significant and positive impact on Brazil’s livestock industry, particularly in Mato Grosso, home to the country’s largest beef cattle herd. Cattle ranchers in the state view this expansion favorably, mainly due to the increased availability of dried distillers grains (DDG).

DDG is a valuable co-product of ethanol production, obtained from the fermentation of corn starch. With a low moisture content of approximately 10% to 12%, it is easy to store and has become a key component of animal nutrition. Modern livestock farming is built on four main pillars, genetics, nutrition, management, and animal health, with nutrition playing a central role in economic efficiency and profitability.

DDG is especially valued for its crude protein content, which typically ranges from 25% to 32%. This makes it a competitive substitute for soybean meal, which generally contains around 43% crude protein, offering a more cost-effective option and helping to reduce feed costs for producers. The use of DDG in cattle nutrition is well established in the United States, and as Brazil’s corn ethanol industry expands, the product is increasingly reaching international markets.

In 2025 alone, ethanol producers in Mato Grosso exported approximately 73,000 metric tons of DDG, generating revenues of $22.4 million, according to a survey by the Federation of Industries of Mato Grosso (FIEMT).

Beyond the fuel pumps

The repercussions of this corn ethanol boom also extend to the global food and sugar markets. As more corn is diverted to ethanol production, the competition between domestic consumption and exports is intensifying. This trend, coupled with falling corn stocks in China and a potential resumption of large-scale Chinese imports, could drive corn prices significantly higher, echoing the peaks seen in previous harvest cycles. Furthermore, as Brazilian mills face increased competition from corn ethanol, they may pivot back toward sugar production, potentially flooding the global sugar market and impacting international prices at a time when they are already under pressure.

The geopolitical implications are equally significant. The strengthening Brazil-China relationship, characterized by high-level diplomatic engagements and discussions on financing through the BRICS framework, signals a move toward greater economic integration that bypasses traditional Western-centric financial structures. For Brazil, this means balancing its "best moment" in relations with China, its largest trading partner for soy, iron ore, and meat, with the volatile trade environment shaped by U.S. policy.

Ultimately, Brazil’s role in the global energy transition is no longer just about being a supplier of raw materials. It is about navigating a complex web of industrial competition, food security, and superpower rivalry. As the world watches the development of sustainable aviation (SAF) and maritime fuels, Brazil’s ability to manage the delicate balance between corn and sugarcane, and between Beijing and Washington, will determine its standing as a sovereign leader in the new green economy.

Beyond the Myth of Fiscal Balance: Why Public Investment Is the Engine of Brazil’s Industrial Future

Brazil’s economic debate has long been dominated by a persistent dogma: fiscal austerity as an unquestionable virtue. Since the 1990s, a broad consensus has taken root claiming that economic growth depends on privatization, labor market deregulation, and an almost religious commitment to balanced public accounts. Yet international experience, most notably China’s rapid industrial ascent, reveals that so-called “fiscal equilibrium” is not a prerequisite for development. It is, rather, a political choice that has systematically constrained Brazil’s industrial potential.

The belief that public debt must be avoided at all costs ignores the historical foundations of industrial capitalism. From the creation of the Bank of England in the late 17th century to the contemporary Chinese development model, public debt has functioned as a strategic instrument of state policy. It has enabled nations to resolve structural bottlenecks, finance infrastructure, and build complex industrial ecosystems. In Brazil, however, austerity is routinely framed as a technical inevitability, despite the absence of any consistent link between fiscal tightening and sustainable industrialization.

One of the most damaging myths in this debate is the idea that the state cannot “afford” to invest in its own currency. Unlike households, sovereign governments that issue their own money are not financially constrained in the same way. Their real limitation lies not in accounting figures, but in the availability of concrete resources: skilled labor, productive capacity, technology, and raw materials. When the state finances a subway system, an energy plant, or a research center, it is not merely spending, it is creating durable public assets that expand the country’s productive base.

This process follows basic accounting logic: every public liability generated by investment corresponds to an increase in national wealth. Ignoring this reality reduces fiscal policy to a narrow bookkeeping exercise, detached from development goals. For an economy seeking industrial maturity, this mindset is not just insufficient, it is actively harmful.

In Brazil, the situation is further complicated by the increasingly “semi-private” nature of the national currency. Monetary policy decisions are concentrated in a Central Bank that, despite its formal independence, is largely shaped by professionals drawn from the financial sector. This structural overlap generates clear conflicts of interest. High interest rates on public debt disproportionately benefit financial institutions, reinforcing a cycle in which rent extraction takes precedence over productive investment.

The persistence of fiscal austerity, even within progressive segments of Brazil’s political landscape, underscores the ideological strength of this framework. Since the 2008 financial crisis, even orthodox economists in the United States and Europe have acknowledged that money is not neutral and that active state intervention is essential in times of instability. Yet Brazilian orthodoxy remains strikingly resistant to these lessons, clinging to policies that systematically undermine industrial expansion.

This resistance is not accidental. As economists such as Michał Kalecki observed, the refusal to pursue full employment through fiscal policy serves a clear social function: disciplining labor. By maintaining artificial unemployment and suppressing public investment, workers’ bargaining power erodes, enabling higher profit margins for financial and corporate elites. Austerity, therefore, is not merely an economic doctrine, it is a political strategy.

Defending Brazil’s industrial development requires confronting this reality head-on. Reclaiming the currency as a public instrument and restoring the central role of strategic state investment are not radical propositions; they are historically proven paths to development. Without them, Brazil risks remaining trapped in a low-investment, low-productivity equilibrium. With them, the country can build a sovereign industrial base capable of delivering sustained growth, technological autonomy, and tangible improvements in living standards.

In this context, the debate over fiscal policy is not about numbers on a balance sheet. It is about choosing the future Brazil intends to build.

Brazil Records Decline in Poverty and Inequality

Over the past two years, Brazil has undergone one of the most significant processes of social mobility in its modern history. According to a study by Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), based on data from the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNADC) covering the period from 1976 to 2024, 17.4 million Brazilians moved out of poverty and entered social classes A, B, and C. To put the scale of this shift into perspective, that number is equivalent to the entire population of Ecuador.

As I analyze the data, it becomes clear that Brazil is experiencing a structural change in income distribution at a pace not seen in decades. FGV estimates that the speed of social mobility between 2022 and 2024 was 74% faster than the expansion recorded between 2003 and 2014, another period marked by strong upward mobility. In just two years, the share of the population in classes A, B, and C increased by 8.44 percentage points, with between 13 and 14 percentage points linked to households receiving Bolsa Família and the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC).

This transformation is not merely statistical. It reflects deeper economic dynamics, especially the recovery of the labor market and the expansion of formal employment. Marcelo Neri, director of FGV Social and author of the study, emphasizes that income from work was the primary engine behind the rise of the middle class. According to him, the protection rule embedded in Bolsa Família encourages formal employment contracts, which may be the clearest symbol of a new middle class emerging from the base of the income distribution.

Beyond that, Brazil’s strong economic growth over the past four years came as a surprise, even to economists. Few expected such performance, and forecasts largely missed the scale of the expansion. In my view, one of the main explanations lies in the massive expansion of income transfer programs, which began during the pandemic under former president Jair Bolsonaro and were later reinforced.

Much of this expansion took place after the Covid-19 pandemic and gained even more momentum as the presidential election approached. Four months before the vote, Jair Bolsonaro’s administration decided to raise Auxílio Brasil — the name given to Bolsa Família under his government — from R$400 to R$600. The move and the increase was widely seen as an attempt to distance the program from its historical association with the Workers’ Party (PT), led by the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Thus, before the pandemic, Bolsa Família cost around R$30 billion per year. Today, the program alone amounts to roughly R$150 billion annually. Added to this is the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), which guarantees one minimum wage to elderly people living in poverty and to individuals with certain debilitating conditions, also exceeding R$150 billion per year. In practice, Brazil moved from a R$30 billion income transfer system to one approaching R$300 billion, a tenfold increase in social spending, not including unemployment insurance and wage bonuses.

When all transfer programs are combined, Brazil now distributes close to R$400 billion per year, effectively operating a welfare-state model. This approach contrasts sharply with the spending cap period between 2016 and 2020, when efforts to contain transfers coincided with weak economic growth averaging just 1.5% per year.

Income transfers played a decisive role in reigniting growth because low-income households spend virtually all of what they earn, injecting demand directly into the economy. This surge in consumption helped explain, for example, why Brazilian industrial output grew 3.5% in 2024.

The strategy helped put Brazil back on a growth trajectory, but it also increased public debt and borrowing needs. Today, the government faces the challenge of financing these programs amid high interest rates, which explains its push to raise funds in financial markets. The Ministry of Finance, led by Fernando Haddad, is fully aware of these constraints and has often clashed with other factions within the government that advocate for even more spending.

This tension now extends to monetary policy. The new Central Bank president, Gabriel Galípolo, faces difficult decisions, including potential interest rate hikes, placing him in a politically sensitive position given past criticism of the Central Bank’s independence and policy direction by members of PT.

In short, income transfers were crucial to Brazil’s recent growth, but the challenge ahead is calibrating social spending while managing debt, inflation, and interest rates in a more restrictive fiscal environment.

In Brazil, social classes A, B, and C are defined primarily by household income. Class C is generally associated with the middle class, composed of families that can meet basic needs while maintaining some level of consumption. Classes B and A include higher-income groups with greater financial stability. In 2024, Brazil reached its highest historical level of participation of middle- and upper-income classes since 1976. The combined share of classes A, B, and C reached 78.18% of the population, with class C alone accounting for 60.97%, while classes A and B together represented 17.21%.

At the same time, the study shows that lower-income groups reached their smallest proportions on record. Class D accounted for 15.05% of the population, while class E fell to 6.77%. For Wellington Dias, Brazil’s Minister of Development and Social Assistance, these numbers confirm the strength of social policies aligned with economic growth. He argues that integrated policies in education, healthcare, and socioeconomic inclusion, combined with GDP growth above 3% per year, have expanded opportunities for employment, entrepreneurship, and income generation. In his view, money reaching millions of low-income Brazilians through programs such as Bolsa Família has acted as a gateway to formal jobs or supported business initiatives, reinforcing a virtuous cycle of growth.

In practical terms, families with a monthly household income between R$4,000 and R$10,000  — a value equivalent to approximately US$1,850 — are typically classified as middle class in Brazil as of 2026. This income range allows households to cover essential expenses such as housing, food, and transportation, while also supporting basic private healthcare, education, and moderate leisure spending. Above this level, families are considered upper-middle class, while those below it tend to remain concentrated in lower-income categories.

Despite this progress, a concerning reality persists. Recent surveys indicate that most Brazilians would struggle to maintain their current standard of living for long if they lost their main source of income. This vulnerability is not limited to the poorest segments of society and affects a significant portion of the middle class as well. Many households operate with little or no financial reserves, revealing a structural weakness in family financial planning.

This picture suggests that even as millions of Brazilians move into the middle class, economic stability remains limited. Income gains are real, but they are not always accompanied by financial education or the ability to save, especially when you're forced to spend your entire salary. In a country where economic shocks are frequent, this combination makes long-term economic security a continuous challenge, even for those who have already climbed several steps of the social ladder.

Brazil, Hong Kong and Singapore Help Boost U.S. Trade Surplus Under Trump in 2025

According to the United States government's official statistics, Brazil was one of the main contributors to the positive trade results of Donald Trump in 2025, together with the Asian financial centers of Hong Kong and Singapore.

During the first half of the last year, the U.S. enjoyed a trade and services surplus of US$9.2 billion with Brazil, making the country one of the most favored partners of Washington. Only the Netherlands stood above with a surplus of US$20 billion.

Nevertheless, according to a report by ICL, experts point out that the Dutch number is skewed by structural factors. A lot of products that are being imported to the European Union are recorded through the Port of Rotterdam, which leads to the U.S.-Netherlands trade figures being overstated. Also, the substantial impact of the financial services sector on the Dutch economy has a strong effect on the final balance.

Excluding these distortions, Brazil stands out, outperforming several major economies according. The U.S. posted a surplus of US$8.9 billion with Singapore, US$8.6 billion with Switzerland, and US$6.2 billion with Hong Kong. Other countries contributing to positive balances included the United Kingdom (US$5.4 billion), Australia (US$5.2 billion) and Saudi Arabia (US$3.3 billion).

Despite Trump’s aggressive efforts to shrink America’s trade gap, the U.S. continues to run large deficits with key manufacturing economies. The biggest shortfalls remain with Mexico (US$50.3 billion), Vietnam (US$44.2 billion), Taiwan (US$34.4 billion), China (US$33.1 billion) and Germany (US$15.8 billion).

Brazil’s role extends beyond services

When services are excluded and only goods trade is considered, Brazil again appears among the countries helping the U.S. narrow its deficit. Official figures from October show U.S. trade surpluses in goods with Switzerland (US$7.3 billion), the United Kingdom (US$6.8 billion), the Netherlands (US$5.1 billion), Hong Kong (US$2.8 billion) and Brazil (US$2.7 billion), ranking fifth.

By contrast, the U.S. continues to face a deep goods trade deficit, totaling US$17.9 billion with Mexico, US$15.7 billion with Taiwan, US$15 billion with Vietnam, and US$13 billion with China.

Brazilian Panettone Expands to Asia and Oceania, Reaching 50 Countries Worldwide

This year, Abimapi (the Brazilian Association of Biscuit, Pasta, and Industrialized Bread, Cake and Panettone Industries) is also celebrating the expansion of Brazilian panettone into new markets across Asia and Oceania, including Australia, China, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore.

Panettone is a traditional Italian sweet bread, originally from Milan, made with a soft, aromatic dough enriched with candied fruits and raisins and a distinctive vanilla aroma. Over time, it has become a symbol of the year-end holiday season in Brazil and around the world.

Overall, Brazilian panettone is now sold in around 50 countries across all continents

Tariffs, politics and partial rollbacks

The sharp increase in the U.S. surplus with Brazil occurred during a period when tariffs and trade barriers were imposed on Brazilian products. At the time, Trump framed the measures as retaliation over the treatment of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Over time, however, several of these tariffs were gradually lifted.

Even so, Brazilian exports still face minimum tariffs of around 10% to enter the U.S. market, while steel and other industrial products can be taxed at rates exceeding 25%.

Deficit narrows, but imbalance remains

According to the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the American economy still runs an overall trade deficit with the rest of the world. However, that gap has been shrinking rapidly since Trump expanded tariffs on both rivals and allies.

In October 2025, the U.S. trade deficit stood at US$29.4 billion, a sharp decline from US$48.1 billion in September, representing a reduction of US$18.8 billion in just one month.

Brazil–UK Trade Surges 11% as Services Drive Bilateral Growth

Brazil’s trade relationship with the United Kingdom is gaining strength, with bilateral commerce expanding 11.1% over the past 12 months, according to Renata Sucupira, President of the Committee on International Trade and Investment at the British Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Brazil. Total trade between the two countries, in the last 12 months, reached £13.4 billion, boosted primarily by rising activity in the services sector.

Exports of UK services to Brazil grew 17.6%, while Brazilian service exports to the UK advanced 19%, driven by financial services, transport, and travel.

Regulatory Improvements and Global Shifts Fuel Growth

Sucupira attributes the recent acceleration to global economic changes and the strategic need for both countries to diversify suppliers and markets. She highlights that Brazil has become more open and competitive, benefiting from a more favorable regulatory environment, including the country’s updated transfer pricing legislation, now aligned with OECD standards.

This regulatory modernization, she explains, “restored mutual confidence and strengthened the maturity of Brazil–UK commercial relations.”

Brexit Opens New Opportunities for the UK

The UK’s departure from the European Union has increased the country’s flexibility in negotiating new trade partnerships. Sucupira notes the importance of the 2022 double-taxation agreement, designed to prevent incomes from being taxed twice across the two markets. The UK has already ratified the accord, and Brazil is expected to follow.

Once the agreement is implemented, she anticipates an even stronger expansion in bilateral services trade.

Mercosur–EU Negotiations and Their Impact

Although the UK is no longer part of the European Union, the ongoing Mercosur–EU trade agreement remains relevant. According to Sucupira, the deal has “dimensions that cannot be ignored,” and the British Chamber is closely monitoring its developments to identify sectors where Brazil and the UK can deepen bilateral cooperation.

The long-delayed free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union, which will cover one quarter of global GDP and a market of over 700 million consumers, is moving forward after more than 20 years of negotiations. Economist Carla Beni explains that the deal will be split into two parts: an initial economic–commercial text expected to be approved soon, followed by a comprehensive final agreement.

Beni highlights key challenges for Brazil. While the agreement offers major opportunities, it also exposes structural weaknesses, particularly Brazil’s dependence on exporting raw commodities and its severe deindustrialization, with industry’s share of GDP falling from 40% in the 1980s to about 20% today. She argues that Brazil must define a long-term national strategy focused on industrialization, value-added production, and leveraging its large reserves of rare earth minerals.

The economist stresses that without sustained state investment and continuity across different governments, Brazil risks missing another opportunity, repeating its historical pattern of unrealized economic potential. Still, she remains cautiously optimistic, emphasizing the importance of planning, political will, and a long-term vision for development.

Growing Dominance of Services in Bilateral Trade Between Brazil and UK

Services now account for four of the top five categories of traded products, broadly defined, between Brazil and the United Kingdom. This shift signals a diversification away from traditional commodity-based trade.

Renewable energy, technology, and high-value-added services are emerging as major drivers of growth, reinforcing the need to ratify the double-taxation agreement to reduce the heavy tax burden on service imports in Brazil.

Guidance for Brazilian Companies Seeking to Export to the UK

Sucupira encourages Brazilian companies interested in exporting services to the UK to seek support from the British Chamber of Commerce.

The institution provides guidance on:

• identifying partners, suppliers, or clients;

• navigating regulatory environments;

• ESG and responsible investment practices;

• financing options and market-entry strategies.

“Our role is to connect business leaders from both countries and strengthen the bilateral ecosystem,” she emphasizes.

Brazil’s Record-Low Unemployment Masks a Structural Economic Trap, Economists Warn

On November 28, 2025, Brazil celebrated an important event when unemployment dropped to 5.4%, which was the lowest percentage ever recorded. Newly employed people in the labor market are receiving an average salary rise of 7%, and total payroll earnings are "top of the chart," as per one source. Brazil, in terms of the economy, is thought to be in the middle of a boom. But, on the other hand, what if this celebration is just the beginning of a heavy hangover from the past? Economist Paulo Gala says that the country may be hastily approaching a structural wall, not due to crisis or bad policies but owing to the very limits of Brazil's economic model.

A Boom Built on Quantity, Not Productivity

Gala maintain that the Brazilian economy is not growing due to innovative methods or higher efficiency, but merely as a result of a higher number of workers being brought under the umbrella of the labor market. More people are employed in the economy, not productivity increases of the workers or firms. The downside? This model has a shelf life, and Brazil is just now reaching that point. The signs point towards a crucial moment: businesses are not firing employees; rather, personnel are leaving to accept better-paying positions. The creation of payroll jobs is decelerating not because of the unavailability of job positions, but rather because there are no workers willing to take them. Brazil has ultimately exhausted the demographic potential for this growth model.

The Demographic Wall

Numerous nations aspire to arrive at a situation where there is a shortage of labor. However, this "good problem" turns out to be perilous if productivity does not increase with the workforce. A case in point is South Korea, which relied on full employment as a launch pad for a huge tech upgrade. Brazil, however, attained full employment without changing its low-complexity economic structure; what Gala refers to as a 1.0-liter engine trying to compete in a Formula 1 race.

Rather than boosting the engine, Brazil just pressed the accelerator more vigorously.

A Fragile 2026 Ahead

The anticipations for 2026 indicate an even more rapid momentum. Alterations of income tax brackets along with election-year spending will increase the disposable income of consumers. The economy could still surpass analysts' expectations with greater GDP growth.

However, this expansion has limitations: it is fueled by the number of workers, not by their efficiency. When the pool of workers readily available is used up, this approach comes to an end.

Nicolas Kaldor’s Theory: Brazil’s Structural Trap

The situation described is similar to a theory suggested by British-Hungarian economist Nicholas Kaldor a long time ago. He was of the opinion that a country's overall economic growth in the long run is largely determined by the structure of its output, particularly its ability to produce increasing returns to scale, which is the capacity for efficiency improvements as the production output rises. High-tech and modern manufacturing industries are similar to software applications in that they have the potential for huge market expansion — millions of users instantaneously with almost no extra cost. On the other hand, low-skilled service sectors are like barbershops in that if one wants to double the output of such a service, one would need to double the manpower and the physical capacity as well.

The economy of Brazil continues to be in the state of "barbershop mode." A cycle of structural inflation is triggered whenever the economy reaches full employment and salary increases take place at a faster rate than productivity.

The ultimate effect of the labor cost increase along with the unchanged efficiency of the company is that the company must raise prices, which in turn will lead to a decrease in the real income gains that workers have just experienced.

Why Monetary Policy Isn’t Enough

Increasing the interest rates would lead to a decrease in demand but would not resolve the issue of a structural productivity gap. Kaldor cautioned that either way using monetary policy alone would only cure the symptom and not the disease. Investment is disallowed by high rates and investment is exactly what Brazil requires to upgrade its industrial base.

The Only Path Out: A Productive Transformation

Brazil has to make a complete overhaul of its economic productive structure according to sources that are influenced by Kaldor's framework. This transformation will include but not limited to::

• Merging high-complexity industrial sectors – More than just the number of factories; factories that manufacture advanced products.
• Creating technological abilities at home – Moving from being importers or owning plants to being developers of technology.
• Encouraging the confluence of industries with increasing returns to scale – The sectors where the rise in production is accompanied by an increase in efficiency.
• Setting up a nationwide system for innovation and skill transfer – Persistent funding for R&D, training, and progressive industrial policy.
  

Embraer: A Global Aerospace Power Built on Public Resources

Embraer is one of the most prominent cases in this regard. The major airplane brazilian manufacturer was situated next to the Technological Institute of Aeronautics (ITA) to start with, a research institution that received only public funds and later on grew as a state-owned enterprise. It was only after the development of Embraer as a company was marked by cutting-edge technology, a creation of a strong supplier base, and the company's integration into the international competitive environment that the privatization process initiated.

The government, through its procurement, is still today one of the company's major support sources, like public support in the US.

The insiders responsible for Embraer’s privatization contend that the deal was made with the aim of maintaining the country’s strategic control even though the company turned into a private global leader in aerospace. The process of privatization, as stated, was equipped with tight safeguards: control by foreigners was not allowed, no single investor could occupy more than a third of the shares, and the Brazilian government kept a golden share, a special class of stocks that is limited to one and has the power to veto decisions concerning national security and strategic operations. These measures were actually enforced to keep the military part of Embraer under state control and at the same time, the company was allowed to expand to the international market competitively. When, during the Bolsonaro administration, there was one more attempt to get around these regulations and shift control to Boeing, it resulted in lawsuits, regulatory complaints, and political opposition. The agreement was ultimately scrapped and Embraer stayed an independent Brazilian company —proof, according to detractors, that privatization does not automatically endanger national interests when adequate institutional safeguards are in place. In any case, and despite attempts to transfer a company that cost billions of reais of Brazilian taxpayers to an American company during the Bolsonaro administration, the case of Embraer proves that Brazil is capable of succeeding if it creates a whole productive ecosystem rather than just a few individual companies.

Embrapa: The Public Engine Behind Brazil’s Agribusiness Boom

The Brazilian agribusiness sector, which can be likened to a giant, has its glorious rise traced back to Embrapa, the public research institution, which laid the foundations of agricultural science and technology through heavy investments. Private sector, indeed, would not have ventured into the area of research marked by longevity and high risk. Public financing took the opportunity, thereby changing the scenario and making the Brazilian agriculture a world leader.

How Strategic Public Investment and Industrial Policy Can Boost Brazil’s Global Competitiveness

Regardless of political stories that imply the opposite, big economies such as the US are totally dependent on public spending to stimulate new product development and keep the industry competitive. Experts assert that Government procurement plays a crucial role in the U.S economy and attracts trillions of dollars, which is a practice generally connected with state-led or "socialist" development models even though the American rhetoric is completely opposite. The rationale is straightforward: when an investor establishes a potentially successful firm, the state automatically becomes a purchaser of the entire output, promising to buy it for many years. This way of securing the area for a long time enables the companies to expand their inventions and become contenders on the international market.

Brazil is currently in a complex situation: a temporary boom mixed with a long-term fragility. The pitch of the country's growth now comprises a limited resource (available laborers) rather than an unlimited one: knowledge and productivity.

If there are no fundamental changes made to the economy, then wages will continue to rise in contrast with productivity that is not growing, thus, a cycle of inflation and stagnation will always persist. The formula for promoting growth that is sustainable is very clear but difficult to implement. It demands vision, consistency, and a commitment of several decades. For this, the following is necessary::

• Increasing returns to scale activities (sectors where more production results in greater efficiency);

• Creating a country-wide system for innovation and technical learning (making huge outlays in R&D, technical training, and supportive industrial policy).

Brazil needs to establish and support a national ecosystem increasingly focused on innovation and technical education. To achieve this goal, large-scale funding for research and development, technical education, and a sound industrial policy are some of the key points to be implemented. But, in a political and business climate always focused on the next quarter or the next election, who will take the lead in an economic strategy that may take 20 or 30 years to show results?

nstech Aims to Solve Brazil's $100 Billion Logistics Problem with Unique Innovation

Brazil, a country of continental dimensions, faces the inherent challenge of high logistics costs. To compete effectively in distant markets such as Japan, the UAE, and the European Union, the nation must overcome significant hurdles, including high internal and external freight expenses. Experts warn that without adequate modernization, particularly in port infrastructure depth to accommodate larger vessels, the country's ability to export will be severely compromised.

Despite these challenges, recent years have been positive for Brazil's logistics infrastructure. Historically problematic sectors have seen significant progress, notably in the railway segment. This shift is driven by new concessions and the "authorization model," which allows private operators to build and manage railways at their own risk, attracting billions in investment.

The company nstech is responsible for a new solution to address all the challenges presented by logistics, which has long been one of Brazil's main problems. The company solution is revolutionizing the logistics sector by moving beyond isolated systems. nstech has developed the TNS (Transportation Network System), an ambitious, AI-powered digital network that integrates the entire supply chain. This platform could transform Brazil into a global digital logistics powerhouse.

Brazil wastes almost $100 billion every year — the equivalent of half a trillion reais — due to inefficient logistics. It’s one of the biggest components of the so-called Custo Brasil.

The repercussions are drastic: transport firms fail, freight forwarders are heavily impacted, and lives are lost in accidents while the entire process keeps running as if there are no issues. One reason for this constant downfall stands out: companies are unable to handle the problem by themselves.

However, the nstech app turned the problem into an opportunity. The company spotted the light that had gone unnoticed by all others. They discovered that it was not the technology that was lacking but the real bonding among the participants in the logistics chain that was missing..

Their solution, called TNS, is something that neither American, Chinese, nor European tech giants have been able to build. The idea is deceptively simple: imagine if Brazil’s entire logistics network worked like a single app on your phone. With one click, companies instantly connect with 75,000 partners — without bureaucracy, delays, or expensive integrations.

It really looks like something straight from the future, but it is already happening in the everyday world. Even China, the country that probably has the most sophisticated digital infrastructure ever, does not have such a system. The same goes for the USA and Europe. TNS is a one-of-a-kind Brazilian innovation that was developed in partnership with clients for the purpose of solving a significant Brazilian issue worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

The platform is enabled by a very simple mathematical concept: network effects. The joining of each new company makes the entire system even more effective for the others - just like WhatsApp, Uber, or Waze. Through the usage of AI, TNS is continually learning from millions of daily operations, thus optimizing and upgrading its performance all the time.

While traditional logistics firms compete for scraps in a stagnant market, TNS is building an entirely new one — with the potential to return R$500 billion to Brazil’s economy.

This modernization is already yielding results, moving away from a heavy concentration on mineral and fuel transport to include agricultural bulk and, increasingly, container transport via rail.

Another positive development inrecente years is the effective embrace of intermodality in Brazil. This involves eliminating long-haul road segments by transferring grain from trucks to rail wagons, which then connect to fluvial terminals in the Midwest. From there, barge convoys transport the cargo to northern ports for transfer to oceanic vessels.

This growing sophistication, coupled with the expansion of coastal shipping (cabotage) and port terminal investments, is reshaping Brazil's logistics matrix. While the transition generates natural conflicts, the overall trend is one of increased efficiency and a more sophisticated supply chain, which will, in turn, demand advanced risk and insurance solutions from the market.

Brazil Scores Diplomatic Win as U.S. Drops Tariff Threat Under Trump

U.S. tariffs have become a political tool to test who aligns with Washington and who sides with China. Brazil finds itself in a unique position: it is economically dependent on both countries, its two largest trading partners.

Historically, Brazil has maintained a balanced, non-aligned foreign policy, making it unlikely, and harmful, for the country to break commercial ties with either power. Cutting relations with China, for example, would be devastating for Brazil’s economy, given the scale of exports like soybeans.

In this global tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, Brazil is caught in the middle and must carefully navigate both relationships to avoid economic damage.

Brazil’s recent success in avoiding planned U.S. tariffs under Donald Trump is being hailed as a significant diplomatic victory for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration. The decision, which reversed measures that could have harmed key Brazilian exports, has reshaped political debates both inside and outside the country.

According to analysts, conservative groups in the United States who supported former president Jair Bolsonaro were visibly frustrated by the outcome. Their expectation was that Brazil would concede under pressure. Instead, the Lula government maintained a firm but moderate strategy that ultimately prevailed.

Experts note that the Brazilian government avoided retaliation, opened space for negotiation, and waited for economic dynamics to shift. Many Brazilian products targeted by the proposed tariffs, such as coffee, meat, and fruit, are essential to U.S. supply chains. As prices began rising domestically, the political cost of imposing tariffs grew for Washington.

Even The New York Times reported that Brazil had “outplayed” the Trump administration in this dispute, highlighting the effectiveness of Brasília’s low-profile diplomatic approach.

Brazilian economists argue that the victory reflects not only political strategy but also national interest. Tariffs would have harmed Brazilian exporters and threatened access to one of Brazil’s largest trading partners.

China, Global Shifts, and Brazil’s Economic Path

The discussion also connects to broader transformations in the global economy. China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse illustrates how export-led growth can reshape international power dynamics. While Brazil cannot replicate China’s model, particularly given its democratic framework and different labor protections, experts say there are lessons in competitiveness, industrial strategy, and international integration.

South Korea is often cited as an example more comparable to Brazil. The country invested heavily in basic education, technical training, and export-driven industrial development, enabling companies like Samsung and Hyundai to become global leaders. Brazil, by contrast, maintained a protected domestic market that discouraged innovation and global competitiveness.

Reducing Inequality: The Road Ahead

Specialists argue that Brazil’s path to reducing inequality involves a combination of progressive taxation, expanded access to education, and a stronger technical-training infrastructure. Measures such as the recent increase in the income-tax exemption threshold to R$5,000 are seen as steps in this direction, although far from sufficient on their own.

The debate also revisits proposals for a universal basic income, originally championed by Senator Eduardo Suplicy, which would require a much more progressive tax system to be financially viable. Current targeted programs, like Bolsa Família, remain essential for reducing extreme poverty.

Economists point out that claims that welfare recipients refuse work due to benefits are unfounded. In most cases, low wages (not social assistance) are the real barrier to better economic outcomes.

Brazil must deepen its strategic thinking by prioritizing a national development project. No country can secure its future without the capacity to define its own path. Achieving this requires both a clear national strategy and the creation of a new political majority committed to this long-term vision.

Brazil–China Mega Rail Deal and Expanding Chinese Influence in Brazil’s Infrastructure, Ports, and Energy

Brazil and China have taken a major step toward deepening their strategic partnership with the signing of a new agreement to restart studies for a transcontinental railway linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The project, often called the Brazil–Peru Bioceanic Railway, would begin on Brazil’s northeastern coast, in Bahia, cross several states, enter Peru, and reach the Port of Chancay, which is a mega–terminal recently inaugurated by Chinese president Xi Jinping and financed through China’s global Belt and Road Initiative.

Although the accord does not authorize construction yet, it revives a plan first studied in 2015 and shelved afterward. Officials from both countries emphasized that updated studies are essential to move the project forward. The railway could cut export transit times from Brazil to Asia from 40 days to about 28, significantly boosting competitiveness for agricultural and mineral shipments.

The initiative aligns with China’s broader strategy in Latin America: using infrastructure investment to expand commercial, logistical, and diplomatic influence. Even though Brazil is not formally part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese capital is already deeply embedded across the country’s key economic sectors.

China’s Expanding Footprint in Brazil

Agriculture:

China has quietly become a dominant player in Brazil’s grain trade. COFCO, China’s state-owned agribusiness giant, is now Brazil’s largest agricultural exporter, handling 17 million tons of soy, corn, and sugar last year. Nearly 80% of Brazilian soy goes to China, and 9% of all soy sacks exported pass through COFCO-operated terminals.

In the Port of Santos, COFCO is boosting its capacity from 4 to 14 million tons per year with its new STS11 terminal, set to become its largest facility outside China.

Ports and Logistics:

China also controls major container and oil logistics hubs:

• CMPorts, China’s biggest port operator, controls the TCP terminal in Paranaguá, responsible for 11% of Brazil’s container movement. The company recently committed R$ 1.5 billion to expand operations.

• CMPorts is set to acquire 70% of the Açu oil terminal, which handles 30% of Brazil’s crude exports and potentially grant China influence over one-fifth of Brazil’s oil outflow.

Rail and Passenger Transport:

Chinese influence has expanded into passenger mobility as well.

The São Paulo–Campinas Intercity Train, auctioned in 2024, is being built by a consortium in which CRRC, China’s state rail manufacturer, holds a 40% stake. The project requires R$ 14 billion and is slated to open in 2031.

CRRC also secured a R$ 3.1 billion contract in 2025 to supply 44 new trains to the São Paulo Metro.

Energy and Industrial Ecosystem:

China’s infrastructure network in Brazil is supported by Chinese-owned energy giants:

• State Grid, controlling CPFL, manages 15% of Brazilian electricity distribution.

• CTG (China Three Gorges) produces 3.5% of Brazil’s energy.

These companies rely heavily on Chinese-made solar panels, which represent 80% of global production.

Meanwhile, part of the oil passing through Açu comes from Chinese offshore operators CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec, reinforcing an integrated investment chain.

A Global Strategy That Works

Experts say China’s approach — creating interconnected investments across rail, energy, ports, and agriculture — mirrors what some Brazilian entrepreneurs once dreamed of, but with far greater financial and political backing. Unlike failed private attempts at building integrated industrial ecosystems, China’s state-supported model has succeeded across continents.

What Comes Next?

The revived bioceanic railway studies signal a new phase in Brazil–China relations. If the project moves ahead, it will reshape South American logistics, accelerate trade with Asia, and deepen China’s already significant influence in Brazil’s most strategic sectors — from grains to oil, from electricity to railways.

And although Brazil has not officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative, the scale and depth of Chinese investments suggest that, in practice, the partnership is already well underway.

China, for example, avoided the rise of slums through long-term urban planning that decentralized economic development and controlled internal migration through the hukou system. By creating economic hubs across the country, it reduced the need for mass movement to major cities.

Brazil took the opposite path: jobs concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, triggering disorganized urban growth, the expansion of favelas, and the strengthening of criminal networks, fueled in part by the country’s role as a major drug route.

Experts argue that recurring police operations have failed to address the structural causes of urban disorder. Lasting solutions will require coordinated, long-term public policies that move beyond political polarization and primarily target large infrastructure projects, which are essential because they make domestic production more competitive and attract new businesses. At the same time, they generate direct and indirect jobs, increasing people’s purchasing power and further boosting the economy.

Brazil’s Unemployment Hits Record Low, but Job Creation Slows: Economists Warn of a Productivity Bottleneck

Brazil’s labor market continues to defy expectations as new data released this Friday, November 28, shows the national unemployment rate falling to 5.4%, the lowest level recorded since the current PNAD Contínua survey series began in 2012. Despite global markets operating with reduced liquidity due to the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday, Brazil stands out with what analysts describe as near-full employment.

However, beneath the headline and historic number, specialists warn that job creation is decelerating, even as the market remains historically tight.

Slowing Job Creation, Despite Record-Low Unemployment

According to the PNAD Contínua, unemployment is dropping further and is expected to reach 5.3% by the end of 2025, according to projections from labor-market economist Bruno Imaizumi of 4intelligence. But seasonally adjusted data reveals a more nuanced picture: once temporary or calendar-related effects are removed, Brazil’s unemployment rate stands at 5.8%, a low level, but one that has remained flat since July, indicating stabilization rather than continued improvement.

Economists also foresee a temporary rise in unemployment in early 2026, driven by the annual reversal of holiday-season hiring. Companies typically lay off workers in the first quarter after expanding production and sales for the Christmas period. Still, even with this seasonal uptick, Imaizumi expects the early-2026 unemployment rate to remain below the level seen in the first quarter of 2025.

Caged Data Confirms Labor-Market Cooldown

Signs of deceleration are also visible in the latest Caged report, which tracks formal employment based on company filings. In October, Brazil created 85,000 formal jobs, a 35% decline compared with October 2024 and the weakest result for the month in the past five years. The slowdown reinforces economists’ assessment that while the labor market is still hot, its momentum is gradually easing.

A Heated Labor Market Still Showing Structural Weakness

Brazil’s job market remains historically strong. Companies report difficulty finding workers, voluntary resignations have hit multi-year highs, and admission wages have risen 7%, indicating strong competition for labor. Real wages are up 4% year over year, and the real wage mass has increased by 5.5%, helping 1 million families leave the Bolsa Família program as average monthly household income climbed from R$3,000 to R$3,500.

But economists as Paulo Gala warn that Brazil’s growth is concentrated in low-complexity service sectors, with only modest industrial recovery and limited gains in productivity or technological sophistication. This pattern reflects a neoclassical growth model, where employment expands but productivity stagnates, creating structural limits for wage increases and fueling inflationary pressure.

Without productivity gains, companies protect margins by raising prices, risking an economy that may stall under inflation, unable to sustain current levels of wage growth and job creation over the long term.

Monetary Policy Outlook

Given the combination of record-low unemployment and slowing, but still tight, labor indicators, analysts argue that Brazil’s Central Bank is unlikely to begin cutting interest rates in January. A possible move may come in March or April, depending on how inflation, productivity, and labor-market dynamics evolve.

The Challenge Ahead

Brazil’s economy is generating jobs, lifting incomes, and reducing dependency on social programs — all milestones worth celebrating. But economists stress that without a shift toward higher productivity, reindustrialization, and greater economic complexity, the current cycle may be difficult to sustain.

The country now faces the critical challenge of transforming today’s labor-market strength into long-term, productivity-driven, sustainable growth.

Amazon rainforest deforestation affects rainy season in Brazil and harms farmers; soybean and corn production are the most affected

A survey by two researchers from the Federal University of Viçosa, Minas Gerais, and one from the University of California, United States, and published by the Royal Meteorological Society points out that large-scale replacement of the Amazon rainforest by pasture or planting areas is reducing rainfall in regions such as the Brazilian Midwest.

Between 1998 and 2002, the rainy season in the region, comprising Rondônia, southern Amazonas, northern Mato Grosso, and southern Pará, was shortened by 27 days. This has a huge impact on the Brazilian double-crop, in some cases practically making the second harvest impossible. In Brazil, farmers plant soybeans and then corn on the same ground. Without the rain, planting corn after soybean harvesting is practically unfeasible.

According to consultancy AgRural, in 2019, the ideal planting period (window) for the Brazilian corn crop in 2020 should be shorter, as the irregularity of rainfall in recent weeks has caused soybean sowing to be delayed by several parts of the South Central States of the Country.

Brazil continues to burn: on the day Twitter is overtaken by the , #ClimateStrike movement (#GreveGlobalPeloClima), part of Brazil suffers from the burning and another part from the massive arrival of smoke

Satellite images from Brazil's National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) show that the smoke from our Bolivian neighbors and from states like Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul has been covering São Paulo and Paraná cities since yesterday.

The thousands of fire and burn outbreaks that hit the Amazon region and the Cerrado produced a high concentration of carbon monoxide (CO) in the air of São Paulo and Paraná. This had already happened in August in Sao Paulo when the day was night due to the smoke.

In recent days, images of fire whirlwinds in Goiás have taken over social media in Brazil. Residents of several counties in this state have had to rush out of schools and workplaces because of the frightening advances of the fire.

The worldwide demonstrations scheduled for today want to alert the authorities to the current climate emergency facing the world. In Brazil, the protests will be against the policy of socio-environmental setbacks openly practiced by the current federal government.

Yesterday, in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the Climate Coalition activists announced that the environmental movement in the country intends to claim 15 measures for the federal government, among them the application of resources foreseen for the Climate Fund, the Amazon Fund, the Environmental Compensation and the conversion of fines. According to the manifesto released by the group, by 2050 there will be 200 million climate refugees in the world.

The Coalition is made up of institutions such as Greenpeace, the Brazilian Indigenous Peoples Association (Apib), Fight for the Forest, Families for the Climate, Socio-Environmental Tide and political parties opposed to the government of Jair Bolsonaro.