Brazil's Economic Dilemma: How High Interest Rates Fuel Debt and Undermine Long-Term Growth

Brazil enters the coming year facing a central economic dilemma: how to sustain growth in an environment deliberately designed to slow it down. While recent macroeconomic indicators show resilience, including low unemployment, controlled inflation, and modest GDP growth, clear signs of economic deceleration are already emerging. With the SELIC rate hovering near 15% per year, rising household debt, and tighter credit conditions, Brazil risks sacrificing long-term development in exchange for short-term financial stability.

This slowdown is not an unintended side effect of monetary policy. It is, in fact, its explicit objective.

The Monetary Policy Paradox in Brazil

Brazil’s Central Bank has openly stated that maintaining high interest rates is intended to curb consumption, cool the labor market, and reduce aggregate demand. Official communications confirm that economic deceleration is not a policy failure, it is the policy itself.

This approach clashes directly with fiscal policy. Although fiscal rules allow for modest real growth in public spending, any expansionary effect is neutralized by restrictive monetary conditions. The result is a policy mix that suppresses domestic consumption, historically one of Brazil’s main growth engines.

Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Dependence

One of the main justifications for high interest rates is exchange rate stability. As a peripheral economy, Brazil must offer higher returns than advanced economies to attract capital inflows. Consequently, the Brazilian real is often treated more as a financial asset than a currency, leaving it vulnerable to speculative movements.

However, current interest rates frequently exceed what is necessary to compensate for global interest differentials and risk premiums. This suggests that the policy choice reflects not only technical caution but also a political commitment to appeasing financial markets.

Deindustrialization in Brazil: A 40-Year Structural Decline

One of the most damaging long-term consequences of this monetary framework is the collapse of Brazilian industry. In 1980, manufacturing accounted for approximately 25% of Brazil’s GDP. Today, it represents barely 10%.

This decline is largely driven by two structural factors:

1. High Interest Rates and the Cost of Capital

Historically, Brazil has experienced interest rates as high as 40% per year. At such levels, productive investment becomes economically irrational. When investors can earn high, risk-free returns by holding government bonds, there is little incentive to build factories, innovate, or create jobs. Capital is diverted away from the real economy and into financial speculation.

2. Overvalued Exchange Rate and Re-Primarization

An overvalued real discourages domestic manufacturing by making imports cheaper than locally produced goods. This dynamic accelerates the “re-primarization” of exports, shifting Brazil’s economic focus toward commodities such as soybeans, iron ore, and meat rather than higher value-added industrial products.

This trajectory was not inevitable. While Brazil pursued high interest rates and a strong currency, countries like South Korea, China, and Taiwan adopted the opposite strategy with the adoption of low interest rates and competitive exchange rates, forcing capital into productive investment. In Brazil, industrial policy efforts were repeatedly undermined by macroeconomic decisions.

Credit in Brazil: From Development Tool to Financial Extraction

Within this framework, credit has shifted away from its developmental role and become primarily a mechanism for financial extraction.

Brazilian households face some of the highest interest rates in the world, often reaching four-digit annual percentages. Long repayment terms mask the true cost of borrowing, trapping families in cycles of chronic indebtedness. Social guarantees, such as severance funds, are increasingly used as collateral, eroding their original protective function.

At the same time, development banks, once central to industrialization and long-term investment, have seen their role reduced. Subsidized, long-term credit has been dismantled, weakening the countercyclical capacity of these institutions and limiting strategic investment.

Recent Economic Performance and Forecasting Errors

Despite all the structural challenges, Brazil’s economy showed resilience. GDP grew 0.1% in the third quarter, driven by stronger-than-expected performance in industry (0.8%) and agribusiness, while services lagged.

Over the past four years (2021–2024), economists have consistently underestimated Brazil’s economic performance. This pattern of forecasting errors can be attributed to three factors:

1. Underestimation of post-pandemic recovery, which was faster than in most Latin American economies.
2. Misjudgment of structural reforms implemented between 2015 and 2021, which raised potential GDP.
3. Underestimation of fiscal stimulus, particularly during the 2022–2024 period, which generated excess demand.

Inflation in Brazil: Explaining the Puzzle

Inflation has performed better than expected, falling toward the upper tolerance limit of 4.5%, with projections around 4.4% by year-end. This outcome can be explained by three key factors:

1. Global dollar devaluation, which reduced import prices and strengthened the real.
2. A record agribusiness harvest in 2023, lowering food prices nationwide.
3. Structural changes in the labor market, including labor reform, population aging, and the rise of gig economy jobs.

As a result, service inflation has remained contained despite historically low unemployment, and also despite the country's well-known problem of low productivity.

Brazil’s Economic Outlook for 2026

The ongoing deceleration suggests that monetary policy is achieving its intended effect, fueling expectations of a gradual SELIC rate-cutting cycle. Market consensus points to a reduction of around three percentage points, bringing the rate from 15% to 12%. Even so, this would leave Brazil with a real interest rate near 8%, maintaining a contractionary stance.

Fiscal challenges remain unresolved. Although the government aims to achieve a primary surplus, credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded Brazil’s outlook from positive to stable, citing worsening debt dynamics, rigid spending structures, and slow progress in expenditure cuts. A lasting fiscal solution is likely to be postponed until after the 2026 elections.

Meanwhile, Brazil’s stock market has reached successive record highs, driven by expectations of falling interest rates. Analysts argue that Brazilian equities remain undervalued, especially compared to US markets, where valuations, particularly in AI-driven tech stocks, appear increasingly stretched.

Why Structural Reform Is Essential

Brazil’s core economic challenge is not merely technical, but political. Sustainable growth requires better coordination between fiscal and monetary policy, a broader set of tools for the Central Bank beyond interest rates, and the restoration of credit as a driver of productive investment rather than financial rent extraction.

Without addressing capital flow volatility, excessive financialization, and the erosion of development institutions, Brazil risks remaining trapped in a cycle of high interest rates, weak investment, and limited long-term growth. The critical question is no longer whether Brazil can endure high interest rates, but how long it can afford their social and economic costs.

Brazil’s R$760 Billion Infrastructure Bet: Can Private Capital Rebuild the Country’s Economic Backbone?

Furthermore, Brazil is rolling out a R$760 billion national infrastructure plan to reverse years of underinvestment and rebuild the foundations of economic growth. With public infrastructure spending far below the 2% of GDP needed just to maintain existing assets, the country is turning to private capital as the main engine of modernization.

The strategy prioritizes transport and logistics, followed by sanitation, energy, and social infrastructure, and relies on incentivized infrastructure debentures to attract domestic and foreign investors. Projects already underway range from highway concessions linking agribusiness regions to ports to large-scale sanitation expansion affecting millions of Brazilians.

The roadmap is ambitious. The challenge now is execution, and whether stable rules and contract certainty can sustain long-term investment.

Corn Ethanol Disrupts Brazil’s Fuel Market as Vibra Ends Copersucar Partnership and Redefines Ethanol Strategy

Brazil’s fuel distribution market is undergoing a structural transformation driven by the rapid expansion of corn ethanol, a shift that has prompted Vibra Energia to terminate its partnership with Copersucar in Evolua Etanol, a joint venture created in 2022.

Evolua Etanol was established as a 50-50 partnership between Copersucar, one of Brazil’s largest sugarcane groups, and Vibra Energia, the country’s leading fuel distributor. The goal was to secure ethanol supply for Vibra’s nationwide network of fuel stations, covering both anhydrous ethanol blended into gasoline and hydrous ethanol sold directly to consumers.

Under the agreement, Vibra was required to purchase all its ethanol exclusively from Evolua, while Copersucar’s associated sugarcane mills were obligated to sell their ethanol production to the joint venture. The model ensured supply stability on one side and guaranteed product offtake on the other.

Corn Ethanol Undermines Sugarcane-Based Model

However, the partnership lost competitiveness as corn ethanol rapidly gained market share in Brazil. Over the past few years, corn ethanol production has expanded sharply, benefiting from lower production costs, greater price stability and increasing geographic reach beyond the Center-West region.

As corn ethanol became more widely available, Vibra found itself constrained by the exclusivity clause, unable to purchase cheaper and more competitive ethanol from producers such as FS and Inpasa, the latter now Brazil’s largest corn ethanol producer. This limitation reduced Vibra’s flexibility in sourcing fuel and weakened the economic rationale of the partnership.

The original expectation was that Evolua would allow Vibra to stockpile ethanol during the sugarcane off-season, between December and March, and sell it at higher prices. In practice, increased corn ethanol supply during the same period kept prices stable, eliminating this advantage.

Strategic Shift to Gain Market Share

With corn ethanol expanding into new regions, including Maranhão, Bahia and Pará, Vibra also faced constraints in supplying the North and Northeast markets. The inability to access these new production hubs ultimately led the company to exit the joint venture.

According to Vibra’s leadership, the decision is not a retreat from ethanol but a strategic move to increase competitiveness. The company aims to consolidate its position as Brazil’s largest ethanol distributor and potentially surpass Raízen, which currently shares market leadership but faces financial challenges and remains heavily dependent on sugarcane ethanol.

By shifting away from exclusive reliance on sugarcane-based supply, Vibra gains greater flexibility to benefit from corn ethanol’s expansion, lower costs and logistical advantages.

Corn Ethanol Drives Structural Change in Brazil

Industry projections indicate that by 2034, corn ethanol production in Brazil could match sugarcane ethanol output, with both reaching approximately 25 billion liters. However, while sugarcane ethanol growth is expected to stagnate, corn ethanol continues to expand rapidly, supported by Brazil’s position as the world’s third-largest corn producer and by strong demand for biofuels.

The rise of corn ethanol is reshaping Brazil’s fuel distribution market, influencing investment strategies, supply chains and competitive dynamics. As production grows and prices face downward pressure, distributors with diversified sourcing strategies are better positioned to gain market share.

Vibra’s exit from Evolua Etanol highlights how the corn ethanol boom is redefining long-standing business models, and signaling a new phase for Brazil’s biofuels industry.

The AI Bubble and Its Risks for Brazil: Rising Pressure on Energy and Water Resources

Trillions Invested in Artificial Intelligence Collide With Weak Returns, Environmental Costs, and Structural Challenges in Emerging Economies

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly exposing a dual global risk: financial instability driven by inflated valuations and mounting environmental pressure caused by the sector’s growing demand for energy and water. While these challenges affect the global economy, their implications are particularly significant for countries like Brazil, where infrastructure expansion, natural resource use, and regulatory transparency are becoming critical issues.

Economists warn that the AI sector is showing classic signs of a speculative bubble. Trillions of dollars have been invested worldwide based on expectations of future profitability that may never materialize. At the same time, the physical infrastructure required to sustain AI, especially large-scale data centers, is generating environmental costs that remain poorly measured and weakly regulated.

Financial Excess Meets Physical Limits

The global AI market has absorbed an extraordinary volume of capital in the last months, yet the sector’s capacity to generate returns consistent with this investment remains highly uncertain. From a basic financial perspective, investments on the scale of $20–30 trillion would require annual profits in the trillions to justify current valuations. Existing revenue models fall far short of that threshold.

Much of the capital circulating in the AI ecosystem moves within a closed loop among a small group of large technology firms, inflating valuations without expanding real economic demand. This concentration heightens systemic risk and increases the likelihood that a future correction will be abrupt rather than gradual.

Data Centers: The Hidden Physical Cost of AI

Behind every AI interaction lies a data center. Those are facilities that process enormous volumes of data and consume vast amounts of electricity. AI-oriented data centers are particularly energy-intensive because they rely on high-performance chips capable of executing complex computations at scale.

In addition to energy use, water has become a critical and often overlooked input. While companies often suggest that a single AI query consumes only a negligible amount of water, independent academic research challenges these claims. Estimates that account for electricity generation and liquid-based cooling systems indicate that dozens of AI interactions can consume hundreds of milliliters of clean water.

Liquid cooling systems, increasingly adopted by AI data centers, rely on potable-quality water to prevent corrosion and bacterial growth. In many cases, up to 80% of this water evaporates during the cooling process, effectively removing it from the local water cycle. This places AI in direct competition with agriculture, human consumption, and sanitation, especially concerning in water-stressed regions.

Lack of Transparency and Environmental Uncertainty

One of the core problems in assessing AI’s environmental impact is the lack of transparency. Technology companies routinely report aggregate water and energy usage in sustainability disclosures but rarely specify how much is attributable to AI training versus daily operation.

As a result, researchers are forced to rely on indirect estimates based on chip production, data center capacity, and assumed efficiency levels. Even conservative models suggest that global AI electricity consumption already rivals that of medium-sized countries and could double within a few years.

Brazil at the Center of Data Center Expansion

Brazil is emerging as a strategic destination for data center investment due to its large market, expanding connectivity, and relative abundance of renewable energy. Today, the country hosts an estimated 160 data centers with a combined installed capacity of roughly 750–800 megawatts.

Official projections indicate that by 2038 this capacity could exceed 17,000 megawatts, more than a twentyfold increase. This level of demand would be comparable to the electricity consumption of a city with over 40 million inhabitants, highlighting the scale of the challenge facing Brazil’s energy system.

Energy, Water, and Local Trade-Offs

Although many Brazilian data centers rely on renewable energy sources such as hydroelectric, wind, and solar power, these solutions are not impact-free. Hydropower depends heavily on water availability, while wind and solar projects have been linked to land-use conflicts, noise pollution, water use for panel cleaning, and social disputes with local communities.

Water use is also a growing concern. While some facilities in Brazil employ closed-loop air cooling systems that consume less water, the expansion of AI-specific infrastructure may increase pressure on local water resources, particularly if liquid cooling becomes more widespread.

Economic Value Versus Environmental Cost

A key unresolved question for Brazil is whether the economic value generated by hosting AI data centers justifies the environmental and infrastructural costs. Unlike countries that concentrate AI model training, Brazil often hosts facilities focused on data storage and service delivery, which may generate fewer high-value jobs relative to resource consumption.

This raises broader policy questions about industrial strategy, energy planning, and environmental governance. Without detailed data, it is difficult for regulators and society to weigh the true costs and benefits of AI-driven infrastructure expansion.

Structural Risks and a Potential Market Reckoning

The environmental pressures created by AI compound existing financial vulnerabilities. As private funding becomes scarcer and profitability remains elusive, the sector increasingly depends on public support. This dynamic creates moral hazard while shifting financial and environmental risks onto society.

History suggests that periods of technological euphoria rarely resolve smoothly. The combination of inflated valuations, weak revenue generation, opaque environmental impacts, and growing dependence on state intervention points to an approaching inflection point for the AI sector.

Brazil’s Strategic Dilemma

For Brazil, the challenge is twofold: managing the immediate environmental and infrastructural impacts of AI expansion while avoiding deeper exposure to a potential global technology-driven financial crisis. Greater transparency, stricter reporting requirements, and integrated energy and water planning will be essential to ensure that the country does not absorb disproportionate risks without corresponding long-term benefits.

As artificial intelligence reshapes the global economy, its sustainability, financial and environmental, will increasingly depend on decisions made not only in technology hubs, but also in emerging economies that host the physical backbone of the digital world.

Brazil’s Biogas and Biomethane Market Accelerates with New Power Plants, Billion-Real Investments and SAF Projects

From Landfill to Low-Carbon Jet Fuel: How Brazil's Biomethane Policy is Redefining the Circular Economy and Global Climate Fight

Brazil is rapidly emerging as a global laboratory for the circular economy and a key player in the fight against climate change, driven by an accelerating market for biogas and biomethane. This energy revolution is not merely a matter of market growth; it is a systemic policy shift that transforms waste management into a high-value, low-carbon energy source, positioning the nation at the forefront of responsible fuel production and decarbonization efforts.

The expansion is marked by significant private investment, new power generation capacity, and pioneering projects in Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), reinforcing Brazil’s commitment to a cleaner energy matrix and its global climate pledges.

The Policy Pivot: Biomethane as a Decarbonization Bridge

While Brazil already boasts one of the world's cleanest energy matrices, largely thanks to hydro, wind, and solar power, the challenge of decarbonizing transport and industry remains. Biomethane, a renewable natural gas derived from organic waste, is increasingly viewed as the essential "bridge fuel" for this transition — Brazil's light-duty vehicle fleet, predominantly composed of flex-fuel vehicles (approx. 85%), utilizes ethanol in two main ways: as a mandatory blend in gasoline (E30, with 27-30% ethanol content) and as pure hydrous ethanol, chosen by the driver at the pump. 

Added to all of this, the market is responding with massive scale-up. Gás Verde, a major player, is strategically converting its biogas power plants into biomethane production units. This pivot is ambitious, targeting a quadrupling of output from 160,000 cubic meters per day (m³/d) to 650,000 m³/d over the next three years. This shift reflects a broader trend where biomethane is replacing fossil natural gas in critical sectors, from heavy transport to industrial heat.

This growth is underpinned by robust policy and investment signals. According to the Brazilian Association of Waste and Environment (Abrema), biomethane production is projected to double by the end of 2026, with new plants scheduled through 2029 representing approximately BRL 8.5 billion in committed investments.

Policy Innovation: Recognizing "Bioenergy Recycling"

A critical policy debate is crystallizing the role of biomethane within the national climate strategy. Pedro Maranhão, president of Abrema, highlights the need to formally recognize biomethane production as a form of recycling. This policy recognition is not semantic; it is a powerful mechanism for strengthening Brazil’s waste management strategy and enhancing its circular economy metrics.

Abrema’s concept of "bioenergy recycling" incorporates waste-to-energy processes into official recycling statistics. This has already yielded dramatic results: after including informal waste pickers in national statistics, the recycling rate jumped from 3% to 8%. With the inclusion of energy and fuel generation from waste, the rate has now surpassed 20%. This demonstrates the profound impact of policy-driven resource valorization.

Furthermore, COP30 commitments have spurred concrete action, with Abrema facilitating agreements between municipalities and private companies to expand biomethane-powered fleets and scale up infrastructure investments. The message is clear: the diagnostic phase is over; the time for implementation is now.

SAF Breakthrough: The Circular Economy Takes Flight

The global aviation sector, a hard-to-abate industry, is also looking to Brazil for a sustainable solution. The country’s race to produce Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) has gained a significant contender in Geo bio gas&carbon, which is pioneering a closed-loop system using agricultural residues, specifically vinasse and filter cake from sugarcane, rather than vegetable oils.

This approach is designed to produce a highly competitive SAF with one of the lowest carbon footprints globally. Developed in partnership with Germany’s GIZ, the project involves integrating a new SAF plant with an existing biogas unit in São Paulo. The process is inherently circular: residues are converted into biogas, which is then used to produce SAF. Crucially, the CO₂ utilized in the process is biogenic, ensuring a significantly reduced lifecycle emission profile.

The project, backed by an estimated €7.8 million investment and included in Brazil’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), is starting as an industrial-scale pilot with a capacity of 100,000 to 150,000 liters per year.

Global Policy Acceptance: The Corsia Advantage

For SAF to be viable, it must meet stringent international carbon accounting standards. Geo’s sugarcane residue-based route has recently secured approval from Corsia (Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation), the global aviation carbon offsetting scheme.

This certification is a major policy victory, placing the fuel in Corsia’s lowest carbon intensity bracket. As Geo’s Technology Director, Allyson de Oliveira, noted, this ensures maximum economic benefits and global market acceptance, potentially making it the most competitive SAF in the world.

Market Consolidation and Public Support

The momentum is further amplified by market consolidation and public sector support. The strategic, cashless share swap between Orizon Waste Valorization and Vital has created Brazil’s largest waste management company, increasing the waste under management to 14.2 million tons per year, nearly 40% of all waste generated in the country. This consolidation significantly boosts the capacity for large-scale investment in biogas, biomethane, and carbon credit projects.

Simultaneously, the GEF Biogas Brazil Project, a collaboration between the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), UNIDO, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), has provided crucial foundational support. Mobilizing over US$ 270 million in funding and co-financing, the project has trained thousands of professionals and helped shape the public policies that now govern the sector.

As officials highlighted at the project’s closing workshop, biogas is a mature, scalable, and strategic solution for Brazil’s decarbonization goals. Looking ahead, the potential is vast: Paraná’s energy plan suggests that biomethane and biogas could supply up to 38% of the state’s energy matrix by 2050 under favorable conditions, underscoring the profound, long-term impact of today’s policy and investment decisions on the future of responsible energy production.

Eduardo Bolsonaro Has His Mandate Revoked by Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies After Internal Leadership Decision

Brazil's political landscape was roiled this week as the Chamber of Deputies advanced the process to revoke the parliamentary mandate of Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro (PL-SP), the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is imprisoned for attempting a coup d’état and for plotting to assassinate president-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, vice-president-elect Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The move, which also targets Congressman Alexandre Ramagem (PL-RJ), was executed through an administrative procedure by the House's Board of Directors (Mesa Diretora), sidestepping a full plenary vote and immediately escalating political tensions in Brasília.

The decision to proceed administratively followed the expiration of the deadline for Eduardo Bolsonaro to submit his formal defense. House Speaker Hugo Motta led the effort, contacting members of the Board of Directors, many of whom were outside Brasília, on Thursday afternoon to collect the required signatures. Under internal House rules, at least four of the seven board members must sign the document for the revocation to be finalized. Congressional sources indicate this threshold is expected to be met, despite some internal dissent, including a public refusal to sign by Congressman Altineu Côrtes (PL-RJ).

Shift in Strategy Avoids Plenary Vote

The administrative route marks a significant reversal from earlier signals by Speaker Motta, who had suggested that Ramagem's case would be brought before the full plenary. The change in strategy came after consultations with party leaders, who reportedly argued that recent failed attempts to revoke mandates through plenary votes, such as the high-profile case involving Congresswoman Carla Zambelli — who is imprisoned in Italy —, had damaged the institutional credibility of the Chamber of Deputies. By using the Board of Directors, the House leadership sought a more decisive and immediate outcome.

Hugo Motta had previously said Ramagem’s case would be taken to the plenary, but the move was reversed after the Chamber’s decision to keep Congresswoman Carla Zambelli’s mandate was later annulled by the Supreme Federal Court (STF). Like Zambelli, Ramagem has a final, non-appealable conviction. The STF ordered the loss of his mandate after sentencing him to 16 years in prison for his role in the attempted coup. Ramagem is currently in the United States and is considered a fugitive.

Eduardo Bolsonaro is also in the United States and lost his seat due to excessive absences, missing 63 of 78 sessions this year, more than the one-third limit allowed by Brazil’s Constitution. His cassation does not strip him of political rights, and he is also a defendant in a separate case accusing him of attempting to pressure U.S. authorities to prevent the conviction of his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro.

Ramagem’s defense declined to comment the decision, and Eduardo Bolsonaro said on social media that his mandate was not revoked for corruption, thanking his voters.

Opposition Cries Foul

The process has drawn sharp criticism from allies of the affected lawmakers, who described the decision as "regrettable." A senior party — the leader of the PL, deputy Sóstenes Cavalcante — confirmed that Speaker Motta had initiated discussions with party representatives the previous day about convening the board to analyze the revocations. Critics argue that revoking mandates obtained through popular vote without deliberation by the full plenary represents an undue concentration of power within the House leadership.

Furthermore, opposition voices have accused the Legislative Branch of yielding to pressure from certain justices of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF), framing the episode as another sign of democratic erosion and institutional overreach.

Legal Battle Ahead

The political parties of the affected congressmen have pledged to challenge the decision at every possible legal level. Party leaders are currently consulting their legal teams to assess all possible appeals, arguing that the Chamber’s own internal rules would require similar cases to be analyzed and voted on by the plenary, as occurred in previous proceedings.

They also question whether the alleged grounds for revocation in Eduardo Bolsonaro’s case meet the strict criteria defined by House rules, noting that the extraordinary and ordinary sessions cited in the regulations have not occurred in the required form for years. The party has vowed to fight to preserve the mandates of its lawmakers "to the last instance."

As the required signatures are finalized, the Chamber of Deputies is expected to formally announce the revocation of the mandates of both Eduardo Bolsonaro and Alexandre Ramagem, setting the stage for a new and intense round of legal and political disputes in the coming weeks.

Eduardo Bolsonaro Faces Criticism for Refusing to Resign While Remaining in the U.S.

Many commentators argued that Eduardo Bolsonaro has effectively become a “paid traitor to the nation” after refusing to resign his seat in Congress despite remaining in the United States for four months. 

Living in the United States, Eduardo Bolsonaro was receiving a monthly salary of R$46,300 without working and of using his position to conspire against Brazil from abroad while being funded by Brazilians taxpayers. In fact, Eduardo, fearing being arrest upon returning to Brazil, serve only his personal and family interests rather than Brazil’s national sovereignty.

The Chamber of Deputies it was being heavily criticized that would for allowing Eduardo Bolsonaro to vote remotely from the U.S. or grant him a new 120-day leave. These initiatives show institutional tolerance for behavior that undermines the public interest, leaving Brazilian taxpayers to finance a lawmaker accused of acting against the country’s sovereignty and economic interests. 

Therefore, today's decision is a clear attempt by Hugo Motta to improve the popularity of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil and to save his weakened presidency of the House.

Petrobras (PETR3; PETR4) Bets on HVO and Renewable Diesel to Drive Brazil’s Energy Transition

Brazil’s state-controlled oil giant expands investments in green fuels, positioning HVO as a key pillar of its long-term decarbonization strategy

The global energy transition has become a central concern for governments and corporations worldwide, and Brazil is increasingly positioning itself as a relevant player in the low-carbon fuels market. At the heart of this strategy is Petrobras, which has stepped up investments in renewable diesel and Hydrotreated Vegetable Oil (HVO) as part of its broader plan to reduce emissions while maintaining compatibility with the country’s existing vehicle fleet.

Petrobras’ flagship initiative in this segment is Diesel R, a renewable diesel produced through the coprocessing of fossil diesel with vegetable oils, primarily soybean oil, widely used as cooking oil in Brazil. This new technique, called biorefining, uses advanced hydrotreating technology. The result is a fuel chemically indistinguishable from conventional S10 diesel, requiring no engine modifications and delivering significant emissions reductions.

Diesel R: Petrobras’ Drop-In Renewable Fuel That Cuts Carbon Emissions Without Engine Modifications

Diesel R, a renewable diesel developed by Petrobras, represents a practical step forward in Brazil’s energy transition. The main message is that the fuel significantly reduces carbon emissions compared to conventional fossil diesel, while still being fully compatible with existing diesel engines, meaning no mechanical adaptations are required.

Diesel R is produced by combining traditional mineral diesel with renewable vegetable oils, which undergo a refining process that removes impurities and results in a fuel that is chemically very similar to fossil diesel. Because of this similarity, drivers and fleet operators can use it in trucks and other vehicles exactly as they do today.

With Diesel R, the carbon released during combustion was previously absorbed by plants through photosynthesis, which helps lower net greenhouse gas emissions. This makes Diesel R an effective way to reduce emissions immediately, without waiting for large-scale changes in vehicle technology or infrastructure.

Overall, Diesel R is a low-carbon, drop-in solution that allows Brazil to cut emissions in the transport sector while leveraging its existing fleet and strong biofuel supply chain, reinforcing Petrobras’ role in advancing more sustainable fuels.

HVO-Compatible Fuel Without Changes to Vehicles

At Petrobras’ Cubatão refinery, renewable feedstock is blended with mineral diesel and processed in hydrotreatment units, where hydrogen removes impurities such as sulfur and oxygen. This process produces a paraffinic fuel virtually identical to fossil diesel in performance and stability.

According to Petrobras, the key advantage lies in reducing fossil fuel content without altering Brazil’s current vehicle fleet, enabling immediate decarbonization gains. The company reports that the renewable portion of Diesel R can cut lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by up to 87% compared to traditional diesel.

Petrobras technicians explain that almost Ten percent of this fuel comes directly from vegetable oil, because the carbon released during combustion was previously absorbed by plants through photosynthesis. Therefore, the fuel operates in a near-closed carbon cycle.

Diesel R Is Not Biodiesel

Despite sharing a renewable origin, Diesel R and HVO differ fundamentally from conventional biodiesel (FAME). While biodiesel is produced through transesterification, HVO and renewable diesel undergo hydrotreatment, resulting in a cleaner, more stable fuel with superior oxidation resistance and cold-flow performance.

This chemical similarity to fossil diesel makes HVO particularly attractive to automakers and heavy transport operators. Global manufacturers such as Volvo, Scania, MAN and Mercedes-Benz already approve the use of HVO 100, reinforcing its role as a drop-in solution for decarbonizing logistics and industry.

Corporate Demand and Voluntary Climate Targets

Petrobras’ initial commercial focus is on large corporate consumers seeking to reduce their carbon footprint and meet voluntary ESG commitments. Early adopters report that the additional cost of renewable diesel is modest compared to the environmental benefits.

One industrial client estimates emissions reductions of around 400 tons of CO₂ per year, calling the cost-benefit ratio “fully satisfactory.”

Scaling Up: From 10% Renewable Content to 100% Biofuels

Currently, Petrobras produces renewable diesel with up to 10% renewable content, with plans to reach 20% in the coming years. Looking further ahead, the company is preparing for a future in which fuels could be 100% renewable from 2030 onward.

Central to this vision is Petrobras’ investment in Brazil’s first fully renewable biorefinery, located in Rio Grande do Sul. The project involves converting the Refinaria Riograndense (RPR) into a facility capable of processing 100% renewable feedstock by 2028. The biorefinery is expected to produce HVO (green diesel), sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), green naphtha and other bioproducts, strengthening Brazil’s bioeconomy.

“This project is already underway and represents a strategic priority for Petrobras over the next decade,” the company states.

Brazil’s Biofuel Advantage and Market Outlook

Brazil has a long-standing tradition in biofuels, supported by public policies such as RenovaBio, which allows renewable diesel producers to generate and trade CBIO carbon credits. Each CBIO corresponds to one ton of avoided CO₂ emissions, traded on Brazil’s B3 stock exchange.

According to studies by the Energy Research Office (EPE), renewable diesel, particularly HVO, is already one of the fastest-growing biofuels globally. Between 2011 and 2018, HVO production expanded at an annual rate of over 37%, far outpacing traditional biodiesel growth in Europe.

Once produced at scale, Brazilian HVO has strong potential to compete in international markets, especially as regulations tighten emissions standards in Europe and other regions.

Challenges Remain, but Direction Is Clear

Despite its advantages, HVO production requires complex refinery infrastructure, high-pressure hydrogenation units and significant hydrogen supply, still largely derived from natural gas. The availability and cost of sustainable feedstocks also remain key challenges.

Even so, Petrobras sees renewable diesel and HVO as essential to staying relevant in a decarbonizing global energy market.

By investing simultaneously in oil exploration and next-generation fuels, Petrobras aims to balance energy security with climate commitments, driving Brazil toward a greener, more competitive and more resilient energy future.

Santa Catarina Concludes Biogas Pilot Project, Paving the Way for Swine Manure-to-Energy Replication in Brazil

State initiative confirms technical, economic and environmental viability of biogas and biomethane, paving the way for large-scale replication in the swine industry

FLORIANÓPOLIS, SANTA CATARINA — Santa Catarina, one of the world’s most important swine-producing regions in Brazil, has reached a major milestone in its clean-energy transition. The state officially concluded the presentation phase of its pioneering Biogas Pilot Project, confirming the feasibility of transforming swine manure into renewable energy and setting the stage for replication across the country.

The initiative, developed over two years by the Federation of Industries of the State of Santa Catarina (FIESC) through its Decarbonization Hub, in partnership with the SENAI Institute of Technology, CIBiogás, BRDE, Sicoob, Sindicarne and ACAV, evaluated the potential of converting pig waste into electricity, thermal energy and biomethane. The program analyzed 50 farms linked to major agro-industrial companies Aurora Coop, Master and Seara.

Pilot Confirms Strong Emission Reductions and Large-Scale Potential

The study reaffirms the technical, economic and environmental viability of biodigesters as a strategic tool for agricultural decarbonization. The results reveal direct emission reductions exceeding 20% in nursery units and strong performance in finishing farms and production units.

“These numbers confirm the strategic role of biogas in advancing decarbonization,” says Charles Leber, leader of the FIESC Decarbonization Hub.

Santa Catarina’s swine sector underscores the importance of the findings. The state accounts for 8% of global pork exports and holds 33% of Brazil’s national herd, representing over R$10 billion (US$1.8 billion) in economic activity and supporting more than 480,000 direct and indirect jobs. The expansion of biogas solutions is viewed as an economic catalyst for rural competitiveness, regional industry and sustainable development.

A Foundation for Replication Across All Swine Farms

According to FIESC, the pilot is just the beginning. The project generated a comprehensive database, mapping participating properties and producing a detailed profile of Santa Catarina’s swine industry, information that now guides future policy and scaling decisions.

Now the project show where the bottlenecks and advances are, and it doesn’t end here. Armed with data and real experience, the project can make decisions with far greater security, according to Charles Leber, a specialist from the SENAI Institute of Environmental Technology.

The long-term goal is to replicate the use of biodigesters, biogas and biomethane across all swine farms in the state. BRDE, a key financial partner, reinforced that the initiative aligns with its institutional focus on decarbonization and greenhouse gas mitigation.

Santa Catarina Well-Positioned for Biogas Expansion

The findings confirm that the state’s productive density, territorial structure and strong agro-industrial sector make it one of Brazil’s most promising regions for biogas growth. The West and Mid-West regions are especially suited for large-scale deployment.

Biodigesters already in operation demonstrate clear benefits, emission reductions, improved waste management, lower energy costs and enhanced sustainability. With industry support from Sindicarne and ACAV, and financial backing from BRDE and Sicoob, the project is expected to gain momentum as it enters its next phase.

A Scalable Model for Brazil’s Energy Transition

By proving that swine manure can be converted into clean, economically viable energy, Santa Catarina’s pilot positions the state as a national reference for rural decarbonization. The data-driven approach provides a secure foundation for expanding biogas infrastructure and enabling a new, sustainable energy frontier for Brazilian agribusiness.

Brazil’s Inflation Hits Six-Year Low as Public Perception Remains Deeply Split, New Data Shows

Brazil posted its lowest November inflation rate since 2018, signaling positive momentum for the economy, but new survey data reveals a country sharply divided between optimism and financial stress.

Brazil’s official inflation index (IPCA) rose 0.18% in November, slightly below market expectations and marking the lowest figure for the month in six years. Year-to-date inflation reached 3.92%, while the 12-month rate stood at 4.46%, safely under the central bank’s 4.50% upper target. Economists view the result as one of the most encouraging signs for price stability in 2024.

The main drivers of inflation remain non-tradable services, such as education, health care, haircuts, and parking, sectors heated by a historically tight labor market. Brazil’s unemployment rate is now 5.4%, its lowest level in years. Meanwhile, inflation for tradable goods continues to ease, supported by a stronger Brazilian real earlier in the year and six consecutive months of falling in-home food prices.

Still, political volatility has weighed on financial assets. Discussions around a potential presidential bid by Flávio Bolsonaro triggered a sharp reaction in markets: the exchange rate jumped from R$5.30 to R$5.50, and long-term interest rates spiked. A weaker currency increases the cost of imported goods, potentially pressuring inflation in 2025.

Upcoming decisions from the Brazilian central bank’s COPOM and the U.S. Federal Reserve add more uncertainty. A possible Fed rate cut, expected at 0.25 percentage points, may weaken the U.S. dollar and reduce the massive interest rate gap between the two countries, a shift widely viewed as favorable for Brazil.

---

Survey Reveals a Country Split Between Anxiety and Optimism

New findings from the Ipsos Cost of Living Monitor 2025 highlight the paradox of Brazilian public sentiment.

According to the survey, 35% of Brazilians say they are in a difficult or very difficult financial situation, well above the global average of 27%. Yet the same 35% believe their income will increase next year, making Brazilians more optimistic than most of the world.

The divergence between perception and economic indicators is striking. Brazil is the only country among the 30 surveyed where the population blames high interest rates, not global conditions or national policies, for personal financial hardship. This reflects a cultural reality: Brazilians strongly associate financial pressure with the cost of installment plans and consumer credit.

Confusion over broader economic conditions is also clear. 36% of Brazilians believe the country is in a recession, even though Brazil has not entered a technical recession since 2020. Meanwhile, 66% expect interest rates to rise next year, despite forecasts showing the opposite.

Brazil’s unemployment rate stood at 5.6% in the three-month period ending in September, according to the IBGE’s continuous household survey. This marks the third consecutive quarter at 5.6%, matching the lowest rate ever recorded since the indicator began in 2002. A year earlier, the rate was 6.4%.

In total, 6.45 million people were unemployed, the lowest level in the historical series. This represents a 3.3% drop compared to the previous quarter and an 11.8% decrease relative to the same period in 2024. The IBGE also reported a record number of formal jobs, with 39.2 million workers holding signed work contracts.

Total real income reached R$ 354.6 billion, another record, with 5.5% annual growth.

These record lows in unemployment levels, record income, and record formal employment contrasts with earlier predictions that Brazil was heading toward an economic “abyss.” Those predictions, made by economists mostly linked to the Brazilian financial market and also to the country's right-wing candidates, especially those who want Tarcísio de Freitas as president in 2027, have been getting their predictions about the country wrong for years. In this case, 2025 was no different.

The year of 2025 in Brazil was marked by stock market highs, a stable exchange rate, and criticism of political narratives that predict national collapse of an economy that is functioning reasonably well.

Thus, the Ipsos survey indicates that this blend of caution and hope reveals a deeper pattern: Brazilians often expect the macroeconomy to worsen — perhaps because they spend the entire year listening to catastrophic predictions for the national economy in the mainstream media —, even as they believe their own lives will improve. But until lower interest rates and tax changes show up — the country implemented a major tax reform this year — in household budgets, the gap between perception and economic data is likely to persist. 

Brazil’s Deindustrialization Is Not What It Seems: New Data Reveals a Highly Concentrated and Uneven Decline

For years, the narrative around Brazil’s economic decline has pointed to a single culprit: deindustrialization. The story often sounds straightforward, the industrial sector shrank, and that’s it. But recent data tells a far more complex and revealing story, one that challenges long-held assumptions about what really happened to Brazilian industry.

Brazil’s deindustrialization is portrayed as a deep and long-term process that has weakened key sectors such as agribusiness and the automotive industry, leading to widespread job losses. This decline is linked not only to recent political events like the Lava Jato operation, which dismantled major value chains connected to Petrobras and large construction firms like Odebrecht — who led the construction sector in Africa, for example —, but also to earlier policies dating back to the late 1980s and 1990s. Market liberalization under the Collor Plan and the FHC administration opened the Brazilian economy without protecting national industries, accelerating the dismantling of sectors such as electronics, defense, and automotive.

To face this process it is necessary emphasizes the central role of the state in reversing deindustrialization, contrasting Brazil’s limited intervention with the strong state-driven strategies of the United States and China. In the U.S., government investment through institutions like DARPA and massive military-industrial funding has historically created the foundation for technologies later commercialized by private companies — illustrated by examples such as the internet, GPS, and Elon Musk’s reliance on public contracts for SpaceX. This dynamic reinforces the classic “center and periphery” structure described by Celso Furtado, where developed nations concentrate high value-added production and extract wealth from developing economies, maintaining their dominance through economic pressure and strategic intervention.

Infortnately to Brazil, it joined the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus further weakened its industrial capacity, limiting monetary autonomy and suppressing domestic industry through high interest rates and a floating exchange rate. Meanwhile, China achieved rapid growth by rejecting this policy model and adopting long-term state-led industrial planning. Reindustrializing Brazil requires a 50-year national project centered on strong state action, strategic investment, and rule changes that enable industrial development.

If you look at the data, a little more than 20 years ago, industry represented 22% of Brazil’s GDP. Today it’s around 11–12%. 

Today, in Brazil, people say: “Why should I open a company? I’d have to hire workers, face risks, and families aren’t buying much. And if I need a loan, I’ll end up drowning in debt. Why bother, if I can simply buy government bonds?” And this, in my view, it simply kills any industrialization processis practically criminal. The fact that Brazil have one of the highest interest rates (the Selic rate) in the world.

Look at Japan, just for comparison. There’s been an uproar there because they doubled their interest rate on public debt. It went from 0.25% per year to 0.50% per year, and the Japanese were shocked. In Brazil, the Selic it’s already above 15%. 

A Dramatic National Decline, but Not the Whole Story

Between 1986 and 2022, the share of industry in Brazil’s formal employment plunged from nearly 28% to just over 15%. The drop signals a massive economic transformation. And it wasn’t just a cyclical dip.

A 2025 study went further, labeling Brazil “the world’s most severe case of premature deindustrialization.” In other words, the country lost its industrial base before becoming rich, a trajectory very different from that of developed nations.

At first glance, the data paints a bleak picture. But a deeper look reveals that this national average hides a far more uneven and surprising reality.

The Regional Puzzle: Deindustrialization Has an Address

One of the most striking findings is that the decline was not evenly distributed across Brazil. In fact, it was overwhelmingly concentrated in a handful of states.

More than 90% of all industrial job losses between 1985 and 2022 came from only three states:

• São Paulo

• Rio de Janeiro

• Rio Grande do Sul

And the biggest shock:

São Paulo alone accounted for 70% of the total decline.

This means Brazil is not facing a nationwide industrial collapse, but rather a localized crisis in former industrial powerhouses. While traditional hubs were losing strength, other states moved in the opposite direction.

Mato Grosso, for example, saw its industrial employment increase eightfold during the same period.

Brazil today is, in practice, two very different industrial countries: one declining, one expanding.

Sector-by-Sector: What Brazil Actually Lost

The sectoral breakdown is equally revealing. In São Paulo, the epicenter of industrial decline, the process did not happen all at once. It came in waves:

• 1990s: textiles and metallurgy were hit hardest.

• 2000s: automotive and electronics sectors suffered major setbacks.

Each decade claimed different victims, showing that the structural shift was not uniform but fragmented and progressive.

This distinction matters because not all industrial jobs are equal. Losing low-tech sectors is one thing; losing the industries that drive innovation is another.

And that is exactly what happened.

High-Tech Industries Were the Most Affected

Studies divide manufacturing into two groups:

• High-technology industries: electronics, chemicals, automotive, machinery

• Low-technology industries: food, textiles, clothing, footwear

The data shows a troubling pattern: the sharpest declines occurred in the high-tech group.

The electrical and electronics sector, for instance, saw its share of employment collapse by nearly 66%.

These are precisely the industries that foster productivity, innovation, and long-term development, the backbone of a modern economy.

The Human Impact: A “Malignant Structural Shift”

Beyond maps and charts, the consequences fall on workers. The study uses a term that sounds technical, “malignant structural change”, but its meaning is simple and alarming.

Workers left industries with higher wages and ended up in sectors with lower pay.

A chart from the study shows that while wages rose slightly for those who remained in certain sectors, these gains were completely offset by the mass migration into worse-paying jobs.

In practice:

• The labor market deteriorated.

• Household incomes fell.

• The shift from industry to services translated into lower living standards for millions of workers.

The Verdict: Deindustrialization Has Three Faces in Brazil

After analyzing geography, sectors, wages, and long-term data, researchers describe Brazil’s deindustrialization as having three defining characteristics:

1. It is highly concentrated: not a nationwide phenomenon, but one rooted in a few key states;

2. It is heterogeneous: each region and each industry tells a different story;

3. It is malignant: the country is losing high-tech sectors while pushing workers into lower-quality jobs.

These findings raise a crucial question for policymakers:

If the problem is not the same everywhere, can a single national strategy solve it?

The answer may shape the future of Brazil’s economy, and determine whether the country can rebuild a modern, competitive industrial base or remain trapped in a cycle of premature decline.

The central argument is that Brazil must focus on producing goods and services that the world wants to buy, regardless of the price, following the model of companies like Apple, which sells an identity and an experience (the iPhone), and not just a product.

A developed country reaches a point where industrialization gives way to the production of sophisticated, high value-added services, such as Engineering, Finance, Robotics, Insurance, and smart home technologies. 

There is a concrete opportunity to reverse Brazilian deindustrialization by focusing on the Health Industrial Complex:

The Federal Government alone annually imports US$ 18 billion in health products from India, China, and Europe.

It is estimated that 80% of these imports are for products with expired patents.

By adding the spending of states, municipalities, and the private sector, the total imports reach about US$ 40 billion (approximately R$ 200 billion).

All of this government spending would be able to could be used to generate a national industrial park through mechanisms such as:

• Copying and pasting technologies from expired patents;
• Business incubators;
• Government purchases protected by WTO rules, guaranteeing a market for local production.

The entire reindustrialization process could therefore begin with the Unified Health System (SUS), the Brazilian public healthcare system. Strengthening and equipping SUS would expand domestic production of medical supplies and technologies, create large numbers of care-related jobs, and meet a massive unmet demand, since seven out of ten health appointments in Brazil occur through SUS. Because demand far exceeds supply, any expansion of the system would immediately generate its own economic activity.

A second priority is the defense sector, which is currently underfunded and technologically weakened. Additional key areas include agro-industry, through the domestic development of fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, machinery, and patented technologies currently imported from foreign monopolies; and bioenergy, viewed as the most important sector for Brazil’s future. Developing bioenergy would allow the country to use its natural resources sustainably while positioning itself at the technological frontier. Furthermore, if we think about the Amazon, which can be seen as a “natural library” rich in scientific potential, which Brazil fails to harness, often allowing foreign researchers to extract knowledge only for the country to buy back expensive finished products. Protecting this ecosystem and investing in its scientific potential are framed as essential to a sustainable and socially just development model.

Biogas in Brazil: How Small and Medium Farmers Can Cut Costs and Boost Sustainability

Did you know that animal manure and leftover crop residues, materials often discarded in rural properties, can be turned into clean, renewable energy? This is the premise behind biogas, a technology that can significantly reduce fuel and electricity costs for Brazilian farmers.

In a recent episode of Ganhando o Futuro, host Luciane Iur interviewed Yuri Queiroz, president of ABREM (the Brazilian Association for Waste-to-Energy Recovery), to explain how biogas works, why Brazil uses only 3% of its potential, and how small and medium farmers can benefit financially from this growing market.

What Is Biogas and How Is It Produced?

Biogas is generated from the anaerobic decomposition of organic waste, such as animal manure, agricultural residues, and urban organic waste, inside biodigesters. During this process, microorganisms break down the material without oxygen, producing a gas composed of roughly:

• 60% methane (biomethane)

• 40% carbon dioxide

After purification systems such as membranes, PSA, or washing units remove CO₂, the resulting biomethane has nearly the same chemical composition as natural gas. It can be injected into the gas grid, used to power tractors and trucks, or converted into electricity directly on the farm.

"Biomethane is already fully regulated in Brazil and can be mixed in any proportion with natural gas," explains Yuri.

How Small and Medium Farmers Can Adopt Biogas

Producers can use residues from:

• Swine, poultry, and cattle operations

• Sugarcane processing (vinasse and filter cake)

• Crop biomass and other organic waste

By installing a biodigester, either on their own or through partnerships, they can generate electricity or vehicle fuel, lowering operating costs and reducing dependence on external suppliers.

For small and medium farmers, the path often involves cooperatives to gain scale, pool resources, and negotiate contracts with investors and biogas companies.

Why Does Brazil Use Only 3% of Its Biogas Potential?

Despite being one of the world’s largest agricultural producers, Brazil taps into only a fraction of its biogas capacity. According to ABREM:

• 75% of the country's biogas today comes from landfills, and

• up to 70% of that gas is still lost to the atmosphere, contributing to greenhouse-gas emissions.

Yet 92% of Brazil’s total theoretical biogas potential comes from agricultural waste, a sector that remains largely unexplored.

“The biggest barrier is information,” says Yuri. “Producers need to know that this waste has value.”

Government Incentives for Biogas and Biomethane

Brazil has implemented several policies to accelerate the sector:

1. Certificate of Origin (Combustível do Futuro) – 2027 Onward

Starting in 2027, natural gas distributors must blend 1% biomethane into the national gas network. Producers will receive certificates of origin to compensate for the price difference.

2. RenovaBio (Decarbonization Credits – CBIOs)

Biomethane producers can earn and sell CBIOs on the B3 exchange, generating additional revenue tied to emissions reductions.

3. PATM – Energy Transition Acceleration Program

Allows rural producers to use tax credits as guarantees for financing biogas installations.

“These are market-based incentives that bring direct financial benefits to rural producers,” notes Yuri.

Biogas as a Tool for Sustainability and Soil Health

Beyond energy generation, anaerobic digestion produces two valuable by-products:

• Biofertilizer (liquid or in flakes after drying)

• Organic compost (digestate)

Both can replace imported chemical fertilizers, more than 90% of which Brazil currently imports.

This makes biogas a powerful driver for:

• Lower production costs

• Better soil quality

• Reduced methane emissions (11–15 times more effective than other mitigation methods)

• Environmental compliance and easier licensing

Success Stories: Cooperatives Leading the Way

Yuri highlights the case of H2A, a company that partnered with small swine farmers in western Paraná:

• Farmers formed cooperatives

• Their manure feeds local biomethane plants

• Plants generate renewable gas, biofertilizer, and purified biogenic CO₂ used in beverages

With more than R$ 1.2 billion in planned investments, this model demonstrates how small producers can participate in large-scale energy projects.

Training, Support, and How to Get Started

Producers interested in biogas can access training from:

• ABREM

• CIBiogás

• Biogás Brasil (UN project)

• Portal Biogás

• Industry events like the Brazilian South Biogas Forum and ABREM’s Waste-to-Energy Congress

“Today, knowledge is not the problem,” Yuri emphasizes. “Producers need to organize, form cooperatives, and seek partnerships.”

A Growing Market with Untapped Potential

With more than 900 operational plants in Brazil, mainly in Paraná, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais, biogas is becoming a key part of the country’s energy transition. As agricultural waste accumulates and sustainability becomes central to farming, the biogas sector represents both an economic opportunity and an environmental necessity.

For small and medium rural producers, biogas offers a clear path to:

• Reduce energy and fuel costs

• Generate new revenue streams

• Improve soil quality

• Meet environmental requirements

• Participate in Brazil’s expanding renewable-energy market