Brazil and China have taken a major step toward deepening their strategic partnership with the signing of a new agreement to restart studies for a transcontinental railway linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The project, often called the Brazil–Peru Bioceanic Railway, would begin on Brazil’s northeastern coast, in Bahia, cross several states, enter Peru, and reach the Port of Chancay, which is a mega–terminal recently inaugurated by Chinese president Xi Jinping and financed through China’s global Belt and Road Initiative.
Although the accord does not authorize construction yet, it revives a plan first studied in 2015 and shelved afterward. Officials from both countries emphasized that updated studies are essential to move the project forward. The railway could cut export transit times from Brazil to Asia from 40 days to about 28, significantly boosting competitiveness for agricultural and mineral shipments.
The initiative aligns with China’s broader strategy in Latin America: using infrastructure investment to expand commercial, logistical, and diplomatic influence. Even though Brazil is not formally part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese capital is already deeply embedded across the country’s key economic sectors.
China’s Expanding Footprint in Brazil
Agriculture:
China has quietly become a dominant player in Brazil’s grain trade. COFCO, China’s state-owned agribusiness giant, is now Brazil’s largest agricultural exporter, handling 17 million tons of soy, corn, and sugar last year. Nearly 80% of Brazilian soy goes to China, and 9% of all soy sacks exported pass through COFCO-operated terminals.
In the Port of Santos, COFCO is boosting its capacity from 4 to 14 million tons per year with its new STS11 terminal, set to become its largest facility outside China.
Ports and Logistics:
China also controls major container and oil logistics hubs:
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CMPorts, China’s biggest port operator, controls the TCP terminal in Paranaguá, responsible for 11% of Brazil’s container movement. The company recently committed R$ 1.5 billion to expand operations.
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CMPorts is set to acquire 70% of the Açu oil terminal, which handles 30% of Brazil’s crude exports and potentially grant China influence over one-fifth of Brazil’s oil outflow.
Rail and Passenger Transport:
Chinese influence has expanded into passenger mobility as well.
The São Paulo–Campinas Intercity Train, auctioned in 2024, is being built by a consortium in which CRRC, China’s state rail manufacturer, holds a 40% stake. The project requires R$ 14 billion and is slated to open in 2031.
CRRC also secured a R$ 3.1 billion contract in 2025 to supply 44 new trains to the São Paulo Metro.
Energy and Industrial Ecosystem:
China’s infrastructure network in Brazil is supported by Chinese-owned energy giants:
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State Grid, controlling CPFL, manages 15% of Brazilian electricity distribution.
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CTG (China Three Gorges) produces 3.5% of Brazil’s energy.
These companies rely heavily on Chinese-made solar panels, which represent 80% of global production.
Meanwhile, part of the oil passing through Açu comes from Chinese offshore operators CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec, reinforcing an integrated investment chain.
A Global Strategy That Works
Experts say China’s approach — creating interconnected investments across rail, energy, ports, and agriculture — mirrors what some Brazilian entrepreneurs once dreamed of, but with far greater financial and political backing. Unlike failed private attempts at building integrated industrial ecosystems, China’s state-supported model has succeeded across continents.
What Comes Next?
The revived bioceanic railway studies signal a new phase in Brazil–China relations. If the project moves ahead, it will reshape South American logistics, accelerate trade with Asia, and deepen China’s already significant influence in Brazil’s most strategic sectors — from grains to oil, from electricity to railways.
And although Brazil has not officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative, the scale and depth of Chinese investments suggest that, in practice, the partnership is already well underway.
China, for example, avoided the rise of slums through long-term urban planning that decentralized economic development and controlled internal migration through the hukou system. By creating economic hubs across the country, it reduced the need for mass movement to major cities.
Brazil took the opposite path: jobs concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, triggering disorganized urban growth, the expansion of favelas, and the strengthening of criminal networks, fueled in part by the country’s role as a major drug route.
Experts argue that recurring police operations have failed to address the structural causes of urban disorder. Lasting solutions will require coordinated, long-term public policies that move beyond political polarization and primarily target large infrastructure projects, which are essential because they make domestic production more competitive and attract new businesses. At the same time, they generate direct and indirect jobs, increasing people’s purchasing power and further boosting the economy.